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Executive Summary
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Langley Research
Center continually reviews its research programs for their responsiveness to
national needs, and the Langley program in flight-critical digital systems has
been a part of this systematic process. Flight-critical digital systems are in
transition from specialized use to pervasive use, and a more comprehensive
program review is being undertaken to ensure Langley's program is respon-
sive to the changing needs. The first step of this review is to ask industry for
its view of the issues which must be addressed for the practical realization
of flight-critical digital systems. This was the question posed to a significant
sample of the U. S. Aerospace industry at a U. S.-only workshop held at
Langley on December 13-15, 1988. The results of this workshop are relevant
not only to NASA and the participants but also to the entire industry. This
publication documents the workshop and presents the issues and recommen-
dations found by the individual working groups.
Issues that generated the most consensus across the workshop were the
lack of effective design and validation methods with support tools to en-
able engineering of highly-integrated, flight-critical digital systems, and the
lack of high quality laboratory and field data on system failures especially
due to electromagnetic environment (EME). EME is emerging from rela-
tive obscurity as a technical issue to become a pacing issue for flight-critical
systems deployment. There were many important issues identitied by in-
dividual working groups such as proving the effectiveness of mnltiversion
software, the lack of test and certification standards, and the lack of effective
on-line test. The space systems participants had a unique viewpoint since
they come from a tradition where extreme weight sensitivity has forced the
use of non-redundant systems; they remain to be convinced of redundant
systems effectiveness and demand figures of merit before embracing their use
in either space or launch vehicles.
There were 115 participants at the workshop; 85 of them were from off-
siW organizations. Fifty organizations, including 31 commercial organiza-
tions, were represented. An organizational center of gravity would lie near
the commercial aircraft industry. This make up was partly intent ional since
commerdal aircraft has been the primary focus of tile fault tolerance work
at Langley. The good turnout is a measure of the importance of 1he subje¢:t
and is a tribute to the willingness of the industry to support industry-wide
activitie._. One of the overview speakers observed that the audienc(' contained
enoughexpertise to design an aircraft. Judging from the companies repre-
sented and the experience of the participants, many of the critical design
decisions for future U. S. aerospace systems may actually be made by those
in attendance.
Although not a strictly technical issue, most groups had difficulty commu-
nicating about flight-critical digital systems. Much time was spent seeking
common ground on which to define the issues. Perhaps the most important
task is to formulate a common understanding of the problems and a common
language to express that understanding.
2
1 Introduction and Overview
The Flight-Critical Digital Systems Technology Workshop was conducted
by Langley Research Center to elicit the aerospace industry's view of the
technical issues facing those who will be applying digital systems to flight
vehicle functions, where loss of function would cause loss of vehicle or unsafe
vehicle operation. The Langley Research Center has for the past fifteen years
been developing methods to design and validate flight-critical digital systems
with the primary emphasis on systems that would be suitable for commercial
air transport application. Most of the Langley research is generic since it
has dealt with assessing system reliability, designing systems to be validated,
proving designs correct, and other research areas that are generally applicable
to a variety of real-time systems. The aerospace industry on the other hand
is practical and product-oriented, and the views of the issues are not uniform
over the aerospace industry because of the different mission requirements for
different industry products. The workshop was conceived to use the generic
elements of digital systems as a context for the identification of issues that
are or will be of importance to industry. It was felt that the combinatiol_ of
the theoretical and practical would produce a lively interaction among the
participants and result in not only the widest coverage of ideas, but also
the greatest benefit to the participants from having been exposed to greatly
differing views of flight-critical digital systems technology. The workshop was
open to interested parties with U.S. citizenship. The workshop was divided
into three main parts as shown in the agenda in Figure 1.
An overview session opened the workshop, and six speakers prescllted
their views of broad research issues that apply to both commercial and mil-
itary aircraft electronic systems, and to the still broader questions of olec-
tronic reliability. These presentations provided a framework for the more
detailed working group deliberations that followed. The overview session
opened with an introductory presentation by Dr. J. F. CreedoN, wel(om-
ing the participants to Langley and reviewing the goals of the workshop in
the context of the NASA- Langley research program. The followillg presen-
tations addressed research needs that result from increasing use of digital
systems tbr primary flight controls. This increased use is accon_panicd by
an incre;ise in the complexity of flight control systems that inclttdes move
intcgrati(m of flight controls with other subsystems (e.g., propulsion control,
stores management). New requirements for system-wide integrily man_e-
ment including coverage of generic failure modes and threats due to elec-
tromagnetic interference are being established. These newer requirements
translate into a disproportionate increase in design effort making concurrent,
multidisciplinary engineering teams and early analysis of computer system
dependability properties necessary. The presentations challenged some com-
monly held notions by, for example, showing that system failures in a sample
of fielded systems were not caused by coding errors but by other elements of
system implementation. The presentations also emphasized the human side
of the system development process where communication and understanding
between engineering groups must be enhanced to effectively support the in-
tegration of large systems. The visual aids for these talks are reproduced in
Appendix A.
The heart of the workshop was the second part where the working groups
met in three half-day sessions. The participants were asked to preselect
a working group, and there was enough self-selected participation in each
working group to form a viable group for each working group topic. Each
working group was chaired by an industry representative except for the soft-
ware group which was chaired by a university professor. The first half-day
session was assigned according to each participant's stated preference. The
second and third half-day working group sessions were open to further atten-
dance selection at the participant's prerogative. Although there was some
movement between groups, most of the participants chose to stay with their
initial selection. There were seven working groups which represented generic
elements of flight-critical system design and validation. The seven working
groups topics were as follows:
• Aeronautical Requirements
• Space Requirements
• System Design For Validation
• Failure Modes
• System Modeling
• Reliable Software
• Flight Test
The aeronautical and spacerequirement working groups addressedthe
levelsof dependability (e.g.,performanceandreliability)that must beachieved
in order that flight-critical digital systemscan fulfill usefulroles in their re-
spectiveflight regimes.The systemdesignfor validation working group ad-
dressedhowflight-critical digital systemtechnologycanbemadea part of the
initial vehicledesignthus escapingthe traditional "add-on" role of electronic
systems.The failure modesworking group addressedhow the variousfailure
modesimpact the designof digital systemsusedin flight-critical applications.
The systemmodelingworkinggroup addressedthe modelingtechniquesand
support tools that are required to permit designersto adequatelyjudge the
merits of different systemdesigns. Systemreliability modeling formed the
bulk of the modelingdiscussionswhichmayreflect the emphasisthat hasbeen
placedon that aspectof fault-tolerant digital systems.The reliable software
working group addressedhow softwareshouldbe treated asa componentof
flight-critical digital systems. The flight test working group addressedthe
role of flight test in demonstrating the acceptability of flight-critical digi-
tal systems.The following section is devotedto the detailed reports of the
working groups.
The third part of the workshopwasa half-day summary of tile research
issuesfound by each group. This was presentedby each working group
chairmanspeakingfor his group. A viewgraph style summaryof the major
findings is presentedin Appendix B. Thekeyrecommendationswereprovided
by eachworking group chairman. Appendix C contains a list of workshop
participants. A further condensationof the issuesand recommendations
over all the groups is presentedin Figures 2 and 3. The purposeof this
documentis to presentthe issuesand recommendations,sincethey represent
the dedicated labor of somevery knowledgeablerepresentativesfrom the
aerospaceindustry and will beof valueto the industry as it finds its way in
tile ageof flight-critical digital systems.
December 13_ 1988
!):()0 a.m. -- 12:00 noon: Opening Session (Overview Talks)
9:00
9:30
10:00
10:30
11:00
11:30
Dr. J.F. Creedon, NASA Langley Research Center
Dr. Thomas B. Cunningham, Honeywell Systems Research Center
Dr. Carl S. Droste, General Dynamics
Mr. Jim Treacy, Federal Aviation Administration
Mr. Larry J. Yount and Mr. Richard F. Hess
Honeywell Commercial Flight Systems
Mr. Richard S. Ullman, ITT Defense Technology Corporati,)n
1:00 p.m. -- 5:00 p.m.: First Parallel Working Groups Session
• Requirements for Flight-Critical Digital Systems - Aeronautical
• Requirements for Flight-Critical Digital Systems -- Space
• System Design for Validation
• Failure Modes
• System Modeling
• Reliable Software
• Flight Test
December 14_ 1988
8:30 a.m. -- 12:00 noon: Second Parallel Working Group Session
1:00 p.m. -- 5:00 p.m.: Third Parallel Working Group Session
December 15, 1988
8:30 a.m. Chairmen's Reports
12:30 p.m. Workshop Adjourns
Figure 1: Workshop Agenda
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Lack of fully effective design and validation
methods with support tools to enable engineering
of highly-integrated, flight-critical digital systems
Lack of high quality laboratory and field data
on system failures
Figure 2: Summary of Issues Common to Many Working Groups
Collect and analyze data for both operational and
experimental systems
Evaluate the cost-effectiveness of design and
validation technologies
Provide an easy-to-use, integrated, and validated
environment of tools, guidelines, and results
• Establish criteria for EME validation
Figure 3: Summary of Recommendations Common to
Many Working Groups
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2 Summary of Working Groups Recommen-
dations
2.1 Working Group Goals
The seven parallel working groups addressed the topics of aeronautical and
space requirements, system design for validation, failure modes, system mod-
eling, reliable software, and flight test. The participants in each working
group represented industry, government, and academia. The relative repre-
sentation is given in the viewgraph-style summary in Appendix B. To pro-
mote a lively examination of ideas and issues within each working group, the
working group minutes were taken without attributing the items discussed
to individuals or organizations. Each working group report is presented un-
der the names of three participants who were responsible for both guiding
and summarizing the working group discussions and for compiling the report
provided in this section. This team consisted of a working group chairman,
a representative from the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), and a NASA
Langley Research Center (NASA-LaRC) sponsor. The chairman, who in the
majority of cases was from industry, ran the session and ensured that the re-
port captured the proceedings of the working group. The Research Triangle
Institute representative captured the meeting minutes and drafted the work-
ing group report. In all except one case, the RTI representatives had actively
participated in research and development related to the working group topic
being addressed. The NASA-LaRC sponsor handled any problems that arose
and ensured that the working group meeting and report met the objectives
set forth.
Each working group addressed three groups of research issues. The first
group of issues are associated with urgent problems where there is not time
to mount a research program and for which some interim solution is the
best result that can be expected. The government role would be supportive
in providing results of previous/current research and perhaps demonstra-
tions/evaluations of interim solutions. The second group is composed of
research issues associated with longer term problems which are amenable to
being addressed by deliberate research programs. The results of the research
could be aimed at bettering current practice or at solutions to problems
which ar(' anticipated to become critical in the near future. The third group
are research issues associated with problems that may become important at
some more distant time because of a slowly developing technology or because
of some foreseeable market demand.
The following subsections are the working group reports. Although there
was a cross-group transfer of participants, the reports have been, for the
most part, independently generated by separate groups. Issues and recom-
mendations that appear in many reports can be judged to have a somewhat
universal recognition by the total workshop.
IO
2.2 Working Group Report
on
Requirements For Flight-Critical Digital
Systems- Aeronautical
Chair: John Todd, Douglas Aircraft
Co-Chair: James Kelly, NASA-LaRC
Coordinator: Jill Hallenbeck, RTI
ll
2.2 Requirements For Flight-Critical Digital Systems
- Aeronautical
2.2.1 Introduction and Overview
The rapid introduction of digital avionics to jet transportation has been most
profound. Almost every function associated with the operation of recently
manufactured aircraft involves digital monitoring and processing techniques.
The susceptibility of these newer digital systems to electrical transient effects
appears to be higher than that of their older analog counterparts. Recently,
the growing concern of upset to flight-critical, fly-by-wire (FBW) control sys-
tems in military aircraft has been highlighted in technical journals and the
media by reports of high-energy radio frequency (RF) (HERF) fields insid-
iously inducing control-system failures that resulted in loss of aircraft and
life. Additionally, lightning whose encounters are random and even less fre-
quent, can produce more intense voltages and currents for a much shorter
duration that, in turn, can also cause upset. Thus, effects of the electromag-
netic (EM) environment produced by lightning could be even more insidious
than effects that have been shown to be caused by man-made RF radiators
(radar, microwave, television, radio, directed energy weapons).
The most dramatic news to hit the EM compatibility (EMC) community
in some time is the recent revelation that a number of flight-critical, FBW
control systems are highly susceptible to radiated EM energy. Conclusive
proof is hard to come by as system upsets (i.e., nuisance disconnects, actua-
tor movements, etc.) usually occur at significantly lower energy levels (light-
ning currents, RF field strengths) than energy levels that cause component
failures, leave no trace, and are very often nonrepeatable. The problem of
designing highly reliable, maintainable, and lightweight FBW flight controls
is further complicated by the following technology trends.
Two recent trends in technology have increased the probability of digital
system upset. First, commercial and military aircraft (including rotorcraft)
are employing far greater percentages of composite materials, which inher-
ently provide less low-frequency shielding within the Faraday cage provided
by the airframe. Second, the increasing number of modern digital systems
are turning to more densely packaged integrated circuits (ICs) that operate
at lower powers and higher speeds and to more and more complex software.
The susceptibility of these devices is usually evidenced by the response to
12
an undesired transient voltage that creates any unwanted logic state which
shows up on the system output. In general, IC susceptibility is dependent
not only upon the incident source's amplitude and frequency, but also on the
system's circuit values, clock rate, pulse width, pulse repetition frequency,
bandwidth, loop gain, and flow rate of information processed by the device.
Despite these trends, the performance and weight requirements imposed
on military aircraft necessitate the use of FBW flight and engine controls.
2.2.2 Critical Issues
The first issue before the working group was to come to a common under-
standing on a few important issues. The first of these is
2.2.2.1 What is a flight-critical digital system?
The working group discussed a wide variety of topics, including:
1. Reliability requirements
(a) Commercial: 10 -9 /Flight/Hour
(b) Military: 10 -7/Flight/Hour
2. Commercial Aircraft Goal
(a) Never in fleet lifetime will you lose an aircraft
3. The system is required for safe flight while engaged
4. Flight-critical systems are not necessarily required for the _'ntire term
of the mission
5. What/who drives the requirements?
(a) government
(b) liability
(c) industry
(d) consumers
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6. If a flight-critical systemfails, will you necessarilylosethe aircraft?
7. Are developmentapproachesdifferent or the same for military and
commercialaircraft?
(a) Are the processesimilar?
(b) Are there different criteria?
(c) Are differentarchitecturesemergingfor each?
8. Doesn't the definition of flight-critical changedependenton
(a) Is the systemneededthroughout the mission?
(b) Is the systemonly neededduring part of the mission? (e.g.,land-
ing system)
(c) If you losea systemthat wasn't critical, but its lossconfusesthe
pilot and/or crew in chargeof taking alternative measures,does
the systemthen becomeflight-critical?
(d) Is the systemconditionally necessaryonly if it hasbeenswitched
on? (e.g.,automatic pilot)
(e) Overall Mission Reliability
i. Military - Peacetime
ii. Military- War time (e.g.,mayfly with failures if on a critical
mission)
iii. Commercial
2.2.2.2 Flight-critical digital systems
The working group lists the following digital systemsasflight-critical.
1. Primary FBW/Fly-by-light (FBL) Flight Controls
(a) actuators
(b) signaling
(c) computers
(d) sensors
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(e) powersupply
(f) controllers, flight deck
2. Full-authority digital enginecontrol (FADEC)/Electronic EngineCon-
trol (EEC)
3. Primary Flight Displays
2.2.2.3 Flight-critical digital functions
The working group lists the following digital functions as flight-critical in
their opinion.
1. Aircraft stability and control (augmentation).
(a) Enhance stability
(b) Establish stability
2. Propulsion Control (Is this critical for multi-engine aircraft?)
3. Integrated Flight Propulsion Control
4. Flight Displays
5. Structure Load Limiting/Static & Dynamic Stability
6. Stores Management
7. Configuration Management
2.2.2.4 Flight-Critical Systems Implementation Requirements
To achieve a design of a "safe" flight-critical system, the following re-
quirements must be met.
1. Th,' designers must prove that their system will always recover from
any and all non-hard faults reasonably quickly.
15
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The pilot must be integrated into the system design process. He and
the crew are the users of the system and are responsible for normal
operation and for taking alternative actions in abnormal situations.
Well-formed and correctly implemented specifications are absolutely
necessary.
4. A method to verify the completeness and consistency of specifications
must be established.
. Up-front analysis must be performed before functional specifications
are written. How do you get the airlines/government to express their
requirements adequately so that a functional specification can be writ-
ten?
. A requirements methodology, which outlines structured methods for
building requirements suitable for simulation and designed for auto-
matic testing of the requirements, must be developed. This approach
also applies to the design methodology.
2.2.2.5 Discussion of issue areas
The working group decided to spend its time discussing the following
eight topics and related subtopics. They are presented here in the agreed
upon order of importance to the working group members.
1. Fault tolerance/redundancy management:
(a) fault monitoring
(b) fault detection
(c) fault masking
(d) fault isolation
(e) fault types and specifications
(f) system architecture
(g) fault recovery
2. Functional specifications
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3. Requirements methodology
4. Design methodology (for safety)
5. Prove/demonstrate reliability and survivability
6. Validation and verification
7. Certification basis
8. Maintenance (system availability is equivalent to the self-test result)
Discussion summaries of each of the issue areas follow.
2.2.2.5.1 Fault tolerance
As with other flight-critical systems, one of the primary requirements
of FBW flight control systems is that they must be capable of sustaining
hardware and software faults and still be fully operational. Over the past
decade a number of approaches have been utilized to address this require-
ment. They range from very simple schemes where "sufficient" redundancy
on critical components and extensive voting are used to "mask" faults to
more complex schemes involving fault detection, isolation, and some form of
system reconfiguration.
The simplest scheme is unacceptable for several reasons. First., the level
of "sufficient" redundancy is very difficult to define due to the large number
of potential failure modes possible in FBW systems. Second, a high level
of redundancy is required to mask faults in all critical areas. Third, as
undetected and uncorrected faults accrue, the level of redundancy and thus
the reliability of the system falls off rapidly as a function of flight hours.
Therefore, effective fault detection is a necessary first step in sustained FBW
system reliability.
It is evident that any flight-critical fault-tolerant computer system m_lst
be able to handle software and hardware faults. Furthermore, it ._hould be
capable of dealing with coincident multiple faults to a reasonable extent.
Except in the case of purely static redundancy where faults are maske(l via
voting/signal selection, all fault-tolerant systems must be able to detect and
isolate faults. To accomplish this task, sophisticated and overlapping fault
detection techniques are required to provide near unity coverage. The extent
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of coverage overlap will depend on the importance of the operation and the
redundancy of components in each portion of the computer system. Obvi-
ously the greater the coverage, the more complex our system becomes, so
some trade-off must be made between system complexity and adequate fault
detection. The trade-off criteria will depend to some extent on how the
system is designed. Furthermore, coverage criteria will need to be further
defined to better address generic faults issues.
Particular areas of discussion were
1. Types of Faults
2. Upsets
3. Lightening
4. "Hiccup"
It became clear from the discussion that everyone did not have the same
understanding of terminology for describing faults and failures and rather
than spend a lot of time not agreeing, the working group agreed to disagree,
but to standardize the discussion to include the following two "definitions".
1. Fault - any condition which tends to degrade the operation of any part
of the system.
2. Failure - the inability of a system to perform its intended function.
Further threads of this discussion
(a) What are the requirements for digital flight systems (from actua-
tors to sensors)?
(b) Probabilities are associated with requirements - if you can't prove
it should you build it? How do you obtain statistics about faults
(common mode - environment, design, power spikes, lightning,
specification, non-stationary)? How do you predict fault statistics?
What are the marginal areas which can be affected by research?
(c) What is the probability of occurrence of generic hardware faults?
Is this the bottom line?
(d) Where do you put your redundancy?
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(e) If you can't tell how reliable somethingis do you automatically
add back-ups?
i. Do back-upsonly provide a psychologicaladvantage?
ii. Haveback-upseverpaid their way?
iii. Availability of back-up:
A. Back-upis a form of redundancy
B. Back-upsjust point to the needfor high reliability of pri-
mary systems
C. Back-upsmaybeshouldn't be automatically switchedon
- pilot shouldhaveswitch - if hecan't flip it - then failure.
D. Thereis aneedfor reliability figuresin the areaof back-up
systems.
(f) How long shouldrecoverytake?
(g) Requirementsmayneedto stateprobabilities (occurrenceof some
kind of fault under someconditions) to usein design.
We draw on past experience. Each system is new, but past experience
is used as a starting point. Each company has decided on reliability figures
so that each design effort isn't a big research project, but these figures are
company confidential.
NASA-LaRC needs to know experience of companies which is kept secret
from the public, FAA, and other companies. They need a list of expected
faults. These faults seem to vary in importance from company to company.
System reliability analysis output needs to drive testability requirements.
Where is built-in test (BIT), self-test? How much?
2.2.2.5.2 Functional specifications
The proliferation of critical digital flight control systems has evidenced a
number of new, potentially catastrophic failure modes not encountered with
conventional mechanical and analog control systems.
Look at field data rather than other academic "studies" (e.g., multi-
version). In general most companies wilt not release information except to
NASA-LaRC, and then only under certain conditions.
FBW allow improvements in controls (e.g., sticks, input devices).
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The pilot is a critical part of the system. His stressand workload vary
throughout theflight/mission. Heis the monitor of genericfaults. In general,
what shouldbeassignedto the pilot? Howshouldhebe involvedin the design
process?
With specifications,it is hard to tell whether "all the basesarecovered".
Even if the specificationis complete,how doyou know if it is corrector not.
Standardizedspecificationcheckers,stylesheets,and possiblya MIL stan-
dard areneededto validate specifications.Specificationscan be a sourceof
defectsin the implementation.
2.2.2.5.3 Requirements methodology
If the output of the requirements phase of a design methodology is an
executable specification, the designer could then build a model from the
specifications and test the specifications. If the specifications are consistent,
then you can test them and find any errors. Do available tools adequately
support real-time systems?
Proof of correctness efforts and structured programming are two areas
that aid the requirements methodology.
2.2.2.5.4 Design methodology
Today's systems have too many states for a designer to process by hand. A
need for a structured approach to process a design specification is recognized.
Tools to help designers through this process are an immediate need.
The use of design languages, graphics, and possibly English should be
used in specifications to "cut out the middle man" and make specifications
more readable and therefore more understandable to the designer. If the
specifications are immediately understandable to the designer then errors will
be found more readily. (Refer to Communications of the A CM, September
1988, Alan M. Davis, "A Comparison of Techniques for the Specification of
External System Behaviors", pp. 1098-1115.)
There is a need for structured methodology tools, which can verify for
correctness and which support traceability. These tools should support hier-
archical representations, automate code generation/logic synthesis, and pro-
vide a library of reusable, reliable, and validated modules for both hardware
2O
and software.
2.2.2.5.5 Demonstration of reliability/survivability
Optimum protection of critical digital aircraft systems requires both sur-
vivability and recoverability from faults resulting from EM as well as other
causes. For EM induced faults it appears that the use of many different pre-
vention and tolerance techniques may be necessary to harden flight-critical
digital systems to high confidence levels. If properly implemented, these high
protection levels can be achieved with little or no weight and cost penalties
while improving system reliability and maintainability.
The working group felt that the following topics were important in this
discussion
1. Accelerated life testing of environmental effects
2. Synthesize
3. Analysis from experience of similar systems
4. Degradation of system over time
5. Reliability of software
6. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Accelerated life testing is important because of the large number of pos-
sible faults and the apparent random appearance of environmental factors
that create a situation where these faults manifest themselves.
The ability to create testing facilities with control features is extremely
important to our understanding of the environmental phenomenon. These
facilities are extremely expensive. Unfortunately, specifications are vague be-
cause knowledge about unexpected (low probability) phenomenon is limited.
The problem of modeling what is not understood was discussed briefly.
Designers depend a great deal on experience gathered from existing sys-
tems when designing a new system. Experience is what minimizes _ecurrence
of the same mistakes.
Systems degrade with time, therefore systems need to be tested through-
out their lifetime, adding to the life cycle expense, while also adding to the
pool of knowledge from which designer's will draw.
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How doesonebegin to show the reliability of software? How susceptible
is software t,o random generic common mode faults.
How good are the models for FMEA analysis? Is physical fault insertion
good enough? Can enough information be gained by this process? There are
the problems of "building it" to "try it", a very expensive proposition.
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2.2.2.5.6 Verification and validation (V & V)
The working group felt that this topic was too big for them to accomplish
much in the remaining time, so a list of items were compiled for discussion
at a later date.
1. How much is enough?
2. When do you quit?
3. When can you quit?
4. How can the task be partitioned?
5. How can the risks be managed?
6. V & V crosses traditional boundaries of responsibility, how can this be
managed?
7. What tools are available? Must we rely on a "hot bench"?
8. How do you V & V interfaces?
9. How do you V & V complex subsystems?
Automatic theorem provers were discussed briefly. No consensus on the value
of this type of tool was obtained, but its proponents pointed to
1. use as an alternative to testing
"2. use for complementing testing
as benefits compared to traditional V & V.
Opponents referred to the
I. unknown reliability of new tools and techniques
2. dewdoping methodology for when to use these tools
3. "unprovable" parts of the system still need traditional testi_g
as reason to take the "wait and see" attitude about the developing technol-
ogy. Theorem provers have been successfully demonstrated on structured
software, but have yet to make significant headway on hardware, except that
produced by logic synthesis tools.
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2.2.2.5.7 Certification basis
As critical flight control systems have become more complex they have
evolved from pure analog implementations to include digital hardware im-
plementations and now microprocessor based software implementations. The
extreme complexity of a full time FBW flight control system virtually neces-
sitates the use of some type of microprocessor based software implementation
due to their great flexibility and computing power.
While microprocessor based software implementations are well suited for
FBW and autoland systems, they are difficult to verify and validate for cer-
tification due to their extremely large number of possible failure modes and
the indeterminate effects thereof. For a FBW system we would like to avoid,
if possible, the time consuming and costly low level software verification and
critical hardware FMEA verification, as well as exhaustive system verification
and validation efforts.
Specifically, the working group briefly touched on the following topics:
° FAA involvement during development. It is too late to plan certification
after design and development of a new system. The FAA and other
concerned parties should have plans prepared during development so
that certification can proceed smoothly. It is too costly to build a
system that can't fly.
. Basis for certification should be done before production is complete.
This point follows the same argument as above. Plans for flight testing
and V & V for certification should be complete before the first plane
exits the production line.
° Validation of new technologies. The FAA should continue to accept the
responsibility for looking at and approving new technologies. Standards
are needed so that future systems can be designed effectively.
° Validation procedure development. A methodology with specific guide-
lines is necessary to get a product through certification validation. This
methodology should follow the validation of a new technology or new
application of existing technologies.
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2.2.2.5.8 Maintenance
It is suspected that unrecognized (non-permanent) faults are, to a good
extent, responsible for unscheduled removals of aircraft digital equipment.
This suspicion is generally supported by maintenance figures which indicate
that for unscheduled aircraft digital equipment removals, less than 15% can
be traced to the reported failure and in roughly 50% no hard-wired failure
can be found. This trend accounts for the substantially lower Mean Time
Between Removals (MTBRs) of high Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
digital equipment. The direct result of these low MTBRs is higher mainte-
nance costs.
A goal for commercial airlines, as proposed by the working group, is to
have zero unscheduled maintenance of aircraft. A box is placed in the system,
tested periodically, but is never removed. A procedure for revalidation of a
system once it has been disassembled, fixed, and reassembled does not exist
and it is the general consensus that maintenance itself introduces d(_fects into
the system. System developers are depending heavily on BIT and self-test
for _ystem checkout, fault detection and system go/no-go testing on the flight
line, yet these are inexact technologies themselves.
On-card redundancy was offered as one way to accomplish some fault
tolerance that could allow the zero unscheduled maintenance goal.
A concrete goal: make boxes as good as the cables in current systems.
How can we establish EM interference (EMI) failure protection so that
this is a realizable goal?
2.2.3 Research Needs
2.2.3.1 Questions of interest
1. Identification and probability of colnmon mode failure: how do you
design to avoid common mode failure? Can you? Only in commercial?
How far can the system degrade? At all'? Should anybody (e.g., pilot,
crew) know?
2. How do we tolerate intermittent faults? Soft fault - spontaneous recov-
ery? No decision. What do we call it when a sensor starts to drift, but
has not left tolerance?
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3. Definitions of fault types, e.g., soft/hard/intermittent/generic/common
mode.
4. How do we recover the system from common mode failures?
(a) How do we fail?
(b) Leave power level same?
(c) Go to back-up? De-emphasis?
(d) Reconfiguring is a way to recover
(e) Common mode failures
5. How do we model environment?
6. How do we test environment? What are the needed environmental
specifications? How much? (Some work has to be done here.)
7. How do we achieve high dispatch reliability? How high a MTBR should
be required?
(a) How high with need for any maintenance?
(b) As good as cables (inspect periodically)?
(c) Never touch "Black Box"?
(d) Environment changing too fast?
8. How do you maintain a critical digital system?
9. How fast does the system have to recover?
10. Itow long do you need to endure an intermediate transient fault?
11. How often do the various types of faults occur? (Basis for our esti-
mates.)
12. How do we integrate user perspectives in systems design (i.e., pilots,
flight crew)?
13. How do we capture the coupling effects of an integrated control system
in a function specification?
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14. How do you write high-level requirementsfor integrated systems(i.e.,
flight/engine) that can be translated into realizablefunctional specifi-
cations?
15.
16.
How do we test for reliability (acc. life test) and survivability. Unex-
pectedsituations - What are they? What do you do about them?
Lossof function is driven by common mode faults/design errors. How
do we ferret out common mode faults early in the design phase?
17. How do you stress the system to bring out common mode/generic
faults?
18. On future complex highly integrated systems, how do we do the ex-
tensive verification and validation needed? How can we decouple task
verification and validation and then recouple?
19. Use automated theorem proving in addition to traditional test ing method-
ology. This emerging technology may prove very beneficial to the V &
V procedures currently in place.
20. How do we maintain a flight-crucial system over the aircraft lifetime?
21. How do you revalidate a repaired system?
2.2.3.2 Recommended research activities
The following is a table that represents the importance placed by working
group members on each recommendation for a research activity. The work
associated with accomplishing each of the recommendations should begin
within the next two years to meet the needs and requirements identified by
the working group.
Recommendations - how important are they?
H:
M+:
M:
L:
High priority
Slightly less than high priority
Moderate priority
Low priority
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Order
Discussed
2
3
5
Recommendation
NASA-LaRC should do an in-housecompilation
and analysisof in-servicereliability data for criti-
cal digital systemsand presenta sanitizedversion
to the public. Here, "sanitized" meansthat data
will not be attributed to a particular company,
event,or accident,so that reluctanceon the part
of contributors canbe minimized.
Obtain analysisand developmenttools. These
toolswill providemodelsandhelppredict fault in-
surance/fault tolerance/fault detectioncoverage.
Refine structured requirements methodology
tools. Somerudimentary tools have beendevel-
oped by industry, but are not availableand are
not reviewedoutsidethe developersworkingenvi-
ronment.
Obtainstructuredmethodologytools. Thesetools
will easethe documentationstruggle that takes
placeduring everydevelopmentcycle. Thesetools
needto provide traceability of requirementsand
"correctnessverification" features.
Increaseknowledgebasefor systemstresstesting
(random inputs, model noiseenvironment, etc.).
The biggestissuefacing membersof this commit-
tee is how the environment affects the systems.
With more information about environmental ef-
fects, systemscan be better designedto handle
the effects.
Priority
H
M +
L
L
H
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Order
Discussed
6
7
8
9
10
Recommendation
Developcostandtime effectivevalidationand ver-
ification philosophy for complex integrated sys-
tems. The designers and implementors of to-
day's flight-critical systems do not have a good
idea about how extensive the V&V process needs
to be to be adequate. This process is currently
very costly. Responsible maintenance organiza-
tions are also extremely concerned with revalida-
tion after reassembly and maintenance.
Validation of new technologies and background
testing for certification basis (increased confidence
level). The working group members are concerned
with the confidence they can place in new tech-
nologies and new applications of existing technolo-
gies.
Cost trade-offs for designing complex fault toler-
ant systems. How much time and energy should
go into each phase of the development cycle so
that the end product is safe, but the producer
can stay in business.
Validation and maintenance procedures of flight-
critical systems over life of aircraft. Much is heard
in the media about maintenance when there is an
air disaster, yet there are few established proce-
dures for safe maintenance. Developers of new
systems would like to achieve a goal of no unsched-
uled maintenance over the lifetime of the aircraft.
Electromagnetic environment (EME) propagation
analysis and testing and modeling for validation.
Again, how can we get models of the environment
validated so that developers can place high confi-
dence in system modeling?
Priority
H
M
M
M +
It
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2.2.4 References
Davis, Alan M., "A Comparison of Techniques for the Specification of Exter-
nal System Behaviors", Communications of the ACM, September 1988, pp.
1098-1115.
2.2.5 Abbreviations
BIT:
EM:
EMC:
EMI:
EME:
FADEC:
FBW:
FBL:
FMEA:
HERF:
IC:
MTBR:
MTBF:
I{.I_':
built-in test
electromagnetic
electromagnetic compatibility
electromagnetic interference
electromagnetic environment
full-authority digital engine control
fly-by-wire
fly-by-light
failure modes and effects analysis
high-energy radio frequency
integrated circuit
mean time between removals
mean time between failures
radio frequency
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on
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Chair: Robert Gates, Martin-Marietta
Co-Chair: Howard Stone, NASA-LaRC
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2.3 Requirements For Flight-Critical Digital Systems
- Space
2.3.1 Introduction and Overview
High reliability has been required for the digital avionics systems used in life-
or mission-,'ritical space applications. Traditionally, reliability requirements
have been met using extensively tested single string systems built with S-
level parts and with backup components only for crucial single point failures.
Emphasis was placed on fault avoidance as opposed to fault tolerance. Sev-
eral factors contributed to this approach. The extraordinary premium placed
on system weight and power consumption was the primary factor dictating
a minimum of redundancy. Further, techniques to provide redundancy man-
agement were, in the past, crude and the associated hardware would have
represented a significant proportion of the avionics hardware. It was also
recognized that single string systems were much less complex and that ade-
quate single string systems could be designed and tested. Consequently, there
has existed a bias against the use of redundant fault-tolerant systems in the
space application community. The introduction of fault-tolerant systems into
these applications must not only be justified by performance and cost, but
also must overcome the reluctance to depart from established practice.
Tradition notwithstanding, it was the consensus of the working group
that technology advances in hardware, software, and fault-tolerant system
architectur¢_; the increases in lift capability; and the more demanding applica-
tion requirements dictate the need to reassess requirements for fault-tolerant
avionics. There is good reason to expect that fanlt-tolerant avionics systems
will play an increasing role in space applications.
Applications whose requirements were considered in the working group
included the aerospace plane, the shuttle, launch vehicles, earth orbiting
satellites, space station, and planetary craft. However, the discussions were
predominantly directed toward the requirements of the joint Air Force/NASA
Advanced Launch System.
2.3.2 Critical Issues
2.3.2.1 Figures-of-Merit AppropriateFigures-of-Merit (FOM) for avion-
ics used in space applications was the first topic considered in this working
group. No single FOM was identified for all applications. Rather, several
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FOM's must be consideredand the specificFOM's that areappropriate de-
pendupon the characteristicsof the specificapplication. Reliability require-
mentsfor a number of applicationsresult in systemfailure ratesof 10-7 to
10-l° failuresper hour, putting thesesystemsinto the very- to ultra-reliable
range.
It was noted that for launchvehiclessuch failure rates for the avionics
wouldbe inconsistentwith the overallfailurerate of the vehicleandthat often
political and emotional considerationdrive reliability requirementsrather
than cost and technical considerations. Fuel systems,engines,and other
mechanicalsystemsall fail at rates several orders of magnitude higher than
these numbers. The goal for the ALS avionics was in the range of 10 -5
failures per hour, which in turn was substantially lower than that for the rest
of the vehicle.
It was further noted that the cost to validate such a system (10-1°), if
indeed such a system could be validated, would be staggering by present
approaches. It was stated that reliability requirements established should
result in minimum life cycle costs. Presently, the cost of the avionics on
a launch vehicle is a small percentage of the cost of the vehicle and the
opinion was offered that the current avionics equipment is overqualified. The
equipment has survived vehicle explosions and has continued operation. Since
cost of this equipment is relatively small, the tendency has been to make
certain that an expensive vehicle would not be lost due to such an inexpensive
component.
The sensitivity of system reliability to the system recovery parameters
such as coverage on short missions was discussed. It was noted that even
long missions are punctuated by brief periods or mission phases requiring
high reliability. During these phases, coverage would become an issue. Cal-
culations indicate that changing the coverage parameter from unity proba-
bility of recovery to a recovery probability of .9 can change system reliability
by several orders of magnitude for short missions and very high reliability.
Consequently, particular attention must be given to the design o|" self test s
and built-in test and evaluation (BITE) for these applications. It was not_'d
that achieving coverage approaching 100% is extremely difficult in practice.
Industry representatives described an approach or philosophy used by 3_'t
Propulsion Laboratories on certain space applications which de-emphasized
evaluating reliability. Instead, systems were designed to have no single point
failures unless the director approved each instance where a single point failure
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could occur. Systemswere two-failure tolerant excluding theseexceptions.
It w;_spointed out that this philosophycould lead to costly systemsand in
somecaseshad the potential to reduceoverall systemreliability.
rib evahlatereliability, the classesof faults or fault types against which
system fault recoveryand fault masking is effective must be specified in
systemrequirements.With the environmentalstressesthat accompanyspace
applications(thermal, mechanical,radiation, etc.), simplepermanent "stuck-
at" fault modelsare not adequate. More complexfault behavior suchas
transientsmust be considered.The potential valueof the Byzantin_,resilient
systemswhich are capable of handling arbitrary fault behavior for a set
numberof simultaneousfaults wasdiscussed.
Industry representativespointed out that for launch vehiclesthe range
safetyrequirementsdictate moredemandingdesignconstraintsthan do the
reliability requirementsfor missionsuccess.
2.3.2.2 System Costs and Testing Currently, a substantial part of the
costs for a space mission is devoted to testing. In some instances systems are
subjected to excessive testing to the extent that system life could be reduced
by the tests. Each unit undergoes complete burn-in tests, shock tests, and in
some instances tests only appropriate for the development models. Testing
continues up to launch time.
It was noted that multipath redundant avionic systems could potentially
reduce testing requirements. If their use could eliminate full testing of every
unit, recurring system costs would be reduced.
Tile computer performance requirements for flight control of launch vehi-
cles are not very demanding. Excess capacity in the digital computer collld
be used to incorporate features which would lead to a reduction in overall
launch systems costs as opposed to the cost of the avionics system. The
cost of added complexity in the avionics system could possibly be offset by
reduced costs in prelaunch testing and mission planning. Adaptive guidance
and control, embedded health monitoring, system history logging and auto-
mated test and checkout are among the candidate features for the avionics
system which could reduce overall launch costs but would increase the avion-
ics system costs.
Due to the previous bias against multipath systems in the space commu-
nity, development tests should include "piggy-back" tests on flight vehicles
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using conventionalavionics. In thesetests, the multipath systemwould per-
form all the functions and results would be comparedto the conventional
system. The conventionalsystemwould control the vehicle. This would al-
low many of the concernsregardingmultipath systemsto beexaminedand
resolvedwithout making what would beconsidereda large, risky change.
2.3.2.3 System Engineering and Integration Many of the testing
and validation problems that impact current systems are related to the in-
tegration and testing of computer systems. It was felt that while individual
subsystems could be demonstrated to meet their requirements, the problem
of establishing that a system met overall requirements was much more dif-
ficult. The complexity of system designs and the interdisciplinary nature of
modern systems (digital systems, software, advanced sensors, RF systems,
etc.) contributes to this problem. A clear need exists for methods, tools,
and facilities to support system engineering and integration. It was felt that
some of these issues were of the scale that they could not be addressed by
individual companies.
In addition to systems integration, concern was expressed over the need
for validated design tools which can manage the complexity of modern sys-
tems while satisfying the need for systems reliability. It was recognized that
the existing high level commercial design tools such as silicon compilers, soft-
ware language compilers, control system design tools, etc. all have been de-
veloped with performance and functionality as requirements. Requirements
for reliability, fault tolerance, validation, and testability were not considered.
It is not known to what extent these tools could affect systems design in
these areas, but the potential exists to introduce design faults which would
reduce system reliability. With each high leverage design feature provided
by these tools, a sequence of lower level desig_ decisions are automatically
made. These lower level design decisions were made to satisfy performance
and functionality requirements, not to satisfy any of the many other require-
ments characteristic of mission-critical applications.
In this regard, some concern was voiced about the mandated use of Ada
for future systems, even though Ada is recognized as having substantial ad-
vantages for system development.
A need for methods, tools, and facilities for rapid prototyping of systems
was also identified in the working group. Again this was viewed as an area
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beyondthe resourcesof a singlecompany.
2.3.2.4 Future Systems Requirements for more advanced systems with
more autonomy is the trend for space applications. As a result, systems to
meet these requirements are more complex, have greater throughput require-
ments and have more demanding reliability requirements. Intelligent systems
will be necessary to meet mission objectives. All phases of the system de-
w'lopment process will be affected. However, a good deal of concern was
expressed regarding the testing and validation of intelligent systems.
2.3.3 Research Needs
The following tables summarize, in order of priority, the urgent and longer
term research needs identified by the working group.
URGENT ISSUES (NEXT 2 YEARS)*
• What is appropriate figure-of-merit for system design? Factors
include cost, reliability, time, coverage, and availability
• Define approach to specifying parts levels (Class S vs Class B)
• Limit scope of production testing for multipath production
acceptance testing
• Adequacy of fault coverage via bit/self test (example VLSI _ less
than 90%) for advanced fault-tolerant systems
• Integration of new environments into design process -
e.g., S.E.U. and E.M.E.
• How suitable are dissimilar designs?
• Use of Ada in multi-path systems
- Rendezvous
- Real time
*Prioritized
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LONG TERM ISSUES (NEXT 5 YEARS)
Increased emphasis on integration research
- Health monitoring interface
- Validation of adaptive GN&C/intelligent systems
Plan to educate regulatory organizations and key management
people on multi-path systems (requires identification of approval
wickets)
• Establish criteria/architecture for lift-off with known
failures to increase availability
• How to insert modern technology in a long term space program
• Specify more comprehensive fault models including transient
and hardware/software design faults
Concern that modern, high leverage design methods/tools
can contribute unreliability to multi-path systems (e.g.,
unintended redundancy from compilers and graphic circuit
design programs)
• Define recovery approaches during prelamwh phase and
for reusable vehicles
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2.4 Design for Validation/Verification Working Group
2.4.1 Introduction and Overview
Validation refers to the process by which the system requirements (from
which the specifications are derived) are shown to be correct. Verification
is the process by which a system is shown to meet the given specifications.
Demonstrating that a system meets the given requirements is not the same
as showing that the system will perform the desired function, as it does not
guarantee that the requirements themselves are correct. The working group
on Design for Validation and Verification (V/V) was charged with discussing
how to design a flight-critical system so that it can be validated and verified.
Several classes of issues were discussed, commencing with an assessment of
current design methodology, and the need for better systems engineering.
Many participants voiced a desire for a set of design guidelines that would
facilitate V/V. Two of the many chronic V/V problems were discussed, the
first being the need for a suitable language for requirements definition, and
the second being the need for reliable failure data on new technologies. The
working group spent the largest portion of time discussing the need for an
integrated set of tools to aid in the design of verifiable and validatable flight-
critical systems. Many of the other issues were then couched in terms of
the integrated tool set. Each participant was asked to list the research issues
thought to be the most important; the lists were then consolidated and prior-
itized (by majority vote). Each of these classes of issues will be summarized
in subsequent sections, followed by the prioritized listing of research goals,
and a discussion of the issues relating to the integrated tool set.
2.4.2 Critical Issues
2.4.2.1 An assessment of the current situation The working group
meeting began with several participants discussing problems associated with
recently developed systems, in that systems have been plagued with (()st
overruns, late delivery, etc. A major cause of schedule delay was felt to b(" lhe
digital electronics systems. One participant stated that late design changes
to a particular system were causing 1500 wiring changes to be performed
per day, while the actual embedded computer was accounting for between 5
and 15 percent of the entire system errors. The conclusion of this discussion
was that a move must be made toward a total system engineering design
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environment. This approachwould reduce"sideeffects"from designchanges,
and wouldenforcetraceability of design changes throughout the hierarchy of
design. (This same feeling was expressed during the opening session of the
workshop).
Many of the participants from the commercial side of aviation were in-
terested in hearing from those who have been designing military systems, as
they have been using FBW technology for some time. The desire for a com-
pendium of experience gained and lessons learned from the military systems
was expressed. It was thought to be extremely useful to gather and analyze
data especially with respect to failure rates and modes. The participants
were skeptical as to whether such a project could be realized, however.
2.4.2.2 Design guidelines Another major topic of discussion concerned
the development and utilization of guidelines for designing systems that are
inherently verifiable and validatable. As an example, several participants
spoke of designing deterministic systems by avoiding the use of preemptive
scheduling, interrupts and floating point numbers. The rationale behind the
use of such restrictive guidelines would be the elimination, possibly, of a large
number of required simulation runs. An extremely large number of simulation
runs is required to obtain anomalies through the statistical runs (known in
the avionics arena as "rare event data."). The large number of required
runs can be easily demonstrated. If the requirement state that the system
failure rate for a flight-critical system be less than 10 -11 (failure rate of the
structure) for a 6 hour mission, then 10 -13 simulations are required to obtain
the rare event data. Obviously this number is impractical and techniques
must be found to reduce it, possibly by variance reduction techniques such
as importance sampling.
One participant suggested the following example set of guidelines for de-
signing a verifiable and validatable system:
Layered hierarchy of computing functions.
From the application layer down to the silicon layer, each layer should
be strongly verified and should have tight, consistent interfaces to adja-
cent layers. There should exist fault-tolerant capabilities at each layer.
• Isolation of ultra-critical fi,nctions.
l"or special protection, ultra-critical functions should be kernalizcd.
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TraceableDependencies.
To support validation of design modifications, dependencies among
function modules should be logically traceable. (The issue of trace-
ability was raised many times in subsequent discussions.)
Smoothly degradable behavior.
Efficient trade-off between multiprocessing for high performance and
fault tolerance.
Run-time testability and observability.
The assumed attributes of each component should be testable at run
time. That is, if a certain behavior was assumed to be impossible or
certain, this behavior should be observable at run time, so as to verify
the correctness of the assumptions and to assure the adequacy of fault
tolerance.
There was a large degree of interest in developing a standard library
of building blocks, each of which is formally and completely verified and
validated. The functions implemented should be general enough to allow
widespread usage. Each module should have formal specifications and generic
designs, with provisions for modification and re-verification. Custom systems
would be built by connecting the blocks and verifying the connections.
Participants also desired a set of guidelines for using new technologies
and methodologies, such as N-version implementations, design diversity by
dissimilarity, designing integrated vehicle management systems, etc. The
development of such guidelines were recognized as research issues, and will
be discussed in the section where the prioritized list of research topics is
presented.
2.4.2.3 Specific V/V problems Two recurrent problems in designing
for V/V were discussed; the first has a simple but economically impractical
solution, while the second appears to have no satisfactory solution. The first
problem arises when trying to assess the correctness, performance or relia-
bility of a system using new technologies, in that it is difficult to predict
component failure rates, failure modes and possible erratic behaviors. The
classic solution to this problem is to dramatically overdesign the system (for
example, in the Byzantine failure problem); this approach is frequently infea-
sible in systems that are constrained by cost, size, weight, etc. Tile efficacy
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for designing to withstand Byzantine failures was discussed. One participant
claimed to have never seen a Byzantine failure, while another claimed that
all redundant computers that have been built and monitored sufficiently have
exhibited Byzantine behavior.
One participant asked whether it would be feasible and useful to build a
fly-by-wire flight control system (perhaps with a mechanical backup) that is
extensively over-monitored, so as to obtain the needed data. There was near-
unanimous agreement that such an approach would produce badly needed
data. However, there was also near-unanimous agreement that such a system
would not be built by short term profit-minded management.
The second problem is the desire for a clear, precise language for require-
ments and specifications. From the software engineering perspective, studies
have indicated that errors in specifications or requirements are more costly
than any other kind of error. Specification languages have been developed
that are easy to use, but only for narrow applications. (See Rich and Waters,
"The Programmer's Apprentice: A Research Overview," IEEE Computer,
November 1988.) It is not clear whether the design of parts (or all) of a
flight-critical system is a narrow enough application for the development of
a useful specification language. Even if a specification language could be
developed such that the specifications could be shown to meet the require-
ments, only half of the problem would be solved, that being the verification
part of V/V. The problem of proving that the requirements themselves are
correct, consistent, and complete (the validation part of V/V) would still re-
main. The consideration of this problem was considered to be of paramount
importance to virtually all participants in the workshop. It was suggested
that perhaps rapid-prototyping could be at least a partial answer.
2.4.2.4 An Integrated Tool Set Several participants suggested the de-
velopment of an integrated tool set for system design as a valuable research
goal. Much of the session was spent discussing the desired attributes of such
a tool; as such the tool served as a stimulus for the discussion and priori-
tization of many research goals. Even though the development of such an
extensive tool set appears to be a rather lofty goal, it may serve as an agenda
for future research.
The most comprehensive presentation of the integrated tool set is dis-
cussed here. Most participants accepted this proposal as a valid starting
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point, but did not necessarilyagreewith each proposed point. A multi-
phaseprogramfor the development of the tool set was proposed, commencing
with the development of a formal language, in which the requirements for the
flight control system or vehicle management system would be expressed. This
language would be developed mindful of the goal of validation, and would
provide the capability for upgrading the requirements. The Integrated Tool
Set (ITS) would then be used to verify the correctness of the system against
the requirements and specifications at each design phase.
Phase I - Development of requirements and specifications for ITS. The
requirements should consider (among other characteristics) the size and
types of systems to be evaluated and verified, and the system charac-
teristics and parameters to be included.
Phase II - Critical issues (such as those listed in the prioritized list of
research topics) are identified and resolved.
Phase III - Development of an integrated set of tools for performance
and reliability evaluation of systems defined by the specifications. The
outputs of these tools should be in a form that is comparable to the
requirement specifications.
• Phase IV - Evaluation of the tool set. The set of tools, as well as its
integration should be rigorously validated and verified.
It was suggested that the development of silicon compilers for integrawd
circuit design might serve as a model for the development of an integraled
tool set.
The working group participants saw the development of a tool set as a
framework for enforcing guidelines for verifiable designs. The development of
such guidelines was assumed to be the major item on the agenda for future
research.
Part of the third working group session was spent compiling a list of at-
tributes that were desired in such an integrated tool set. The optimism of the
participants was evident during this phase of the discussion, as nearly every
conceivable attribute was suggested and embraced. It was envisioned that
the optimal tool set would nominally have the system requirements as the
input, a_ld would produce design specifications (via an interface to a (',AD
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tool) and a verification test set as outputs. The tool would support some
common language which would enforce traceability, support verifiable hier-
archical development and building block designs, and interface to reliability
and performance tools.
It was clearly understood that such an immense undertaking would re-
quire a long term monetary commitment from NASA and industry. It was
envisioned that NASA would serve as a central control point for tool devel-
opment, and would integrate tools and techniques researched and developed
by others into the tool set, and would support and maintain the tools after
integration. Such an undertaking also requires close ties with industry; in-
dustry should use the tools in good faith and provide feedback to NASA for
future improvements.
2.4.3 Research Needs
Each participant in the working group was asked to list the research items
deemed important for their work in design for validation and verification. The
separate lists were compiled and then were separated into two lists, based on
the desired reseaxch goal. Each of the items on the first list was characterized
by the desire for a set of guidelines for using new design techniques. These
items were designated (by majority vote) as high, medium or low priority.
The items on the second list were other research items to support design for
validation and verification.
2.4.3.1 Guidelines for New Design Techniques
2.4.3.1.1 High priority research items
• Failure containment, coverage, FMEA, redundancy management
Although much has been done in the area of assessing coverage and
assuring failure containment, this area continues to be a high priority
concern, especially in the face of increased integration of flight-critical
functions.
• Environmental effects
The topic of EME and IIERF research was mentioned by several dif-
ferent working groups. The major interest in the V/V group wins an
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assessment of the effects on the failure rates and failure modes of com-
ponents in flight-critical systems.
• Reusable building blocks
The concept of designing systems by utilizing a library of pre-designed
and verified building blocks has been generally accepted as a good idea.
The research needed in this area is in the methodology for developing
and combining building blocks and in the design, verification, and stan-
dardization of modules.
• Concurrent processing
Because of the inherent difficulties in verifying multiprocessor systems
(for enhanced performance rather than fault tolerance), concurrent sys-
tems are currently not approved for flight-critical functions. Techniques
for validation of concurrent systems is thus considered a high priority
item.
• N-version hardware and software
The concept of N-version and dissimilar designs needs to be addressed
more fully; for example, what are the relative advantages and disad-
vantages, is there an optimal N, and how can one quantify the merits.
• Guaranteed determinism
If systems can be guaranteed to be deterministic, the task of valida-
tion is simplified considerably. Research iuto methods for guaranteeing
determinism, even if some subsystems arc, nondeterministic, is needed.
• Complexity metrics and complexity reduction
A methodology should be researched and developed for partitioning
complex systems into more manageable units, perhaps hierarchically.
Issues concerning interfaces and failure containment must be investi-
gated.
2.4.3.1.2 Medium priority research items
• Integration concepts
As systems become more integrated, guidelines must be developed that
pertain to partitioning of the hardware, partitioning of the software,
and partitioning of functions between the hardware and the software.
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If multiple functions operate on the same computer or use data from
the same sensors for example, it is difficult to guarantee independence,
which makes verification and validation more difficult.
Validation of Modeling Assumptions
The participants of the design for V/V working group were concerned
with the concept of testing for the validity of assumptions made in
analysis.
Highly reliable communications
Reliable standard two-way real-time data communications networks
and development of applicable verification techniques is crucial to the
highly-integrated flight control application.
Performance/Reliability Tradeoffs
Guidelines for trading performance for reliability, and a tool which
would allow such trade-off case studies are needed.
2.4.3.1.3 Low priority research item Only one item was deter-
mined to be a low-priority research item, that of determining guidelines for
designing for smoothly degradable behavior. The problems to be addressed
in this area concern the restoration of the system following a transient er-
ror, and the derivation of bit-synchronous protocols that will allow graceful
degradation following an error.
2.4.3.2 Other research needs The research items in this section were
not considered to relate to the development of guidelines for design, but
rather were considered to be research items otherwise related to design for
V/V. This list was not prioritized.
Technology transfer
There should be increased levels of communication between industry,
military and NASA to define the lessons learned on past flight-critical
systems, covering such areas as redundancy management, performance,
backups, documentation, testing, failure modes. It was suggested that
a fuller interaction between NASA, industry and FAA personnel should
be promoted, so that research could be better focused on real problems.
Perhaps researchers could be placed in industry for a time.
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VarianceReductiontechniques
Severalparticipantswantedto seeresearchcontinuein simulation method-
ology asapplicableto flight-critical systems.Someexampletopics in-
cludethe investigationof variancereduction techniquessuchasimpor-
tance sampling, and investigation of the useof parallel processorsto
speedsimulation run times.
SoftwareWaterfall techniqueasapplied to multiprocessingsystems
It is not clear whether current waterfall techniquesfor softwarespeci-
fication are appropriate for multiprocessingand knowledge-basedma-
chines.
Deterministic boundsfor non-deterministicbehavior
For what kinds of non-deterministicbehaviorcandeterministic bounds
be developed?
Formal verification
Work on formal verification should undoubtedly continue; its potentials
and limitations should be realistically evaluated.
Undocumented functionality
Some systems may provide more functionality than is documented.
This can pose a problem when errors on input pins cause the system
to go into internal test mode, for example.
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2.5 Failure Modes Working Group
2.5.1 Introduction and Overview
The goal of the failure modes working group was to identify industry needs
that relate to failure modes in flight-critical digital systems and to suggest
research programs to NASA-LaRC that will satisfy these needs. In other
words, what research help does industry need?
Motivation for this effort stems from the more extensive use of electronics
in flight-critical systems (flight control, engine control, cockpit displays, etc.)
in place of mechanical/hydraulic systems. This shift to electronics has un-
doubtedly created new failure modes that have not yet been discovered. For
example, it is evident that the failure modes in a fly-by-wire flight control
system are not the same as those in a mechanical/hydraulic flight control
system. All failure modes must be identified and understood in order that
industry be in a position to preserve safety. Such information will also allow
industry to improve aircraft reliability and maintainability, which will in turn
increase system availability and decrease system life-cycle cost.
The working group proceeded by (1) formulating a set of definitions that
relate to failure modes, (2) identifying failure mode issues for flight-critical
digital systems, (3) developing a comprehensive list of research problems
by brainstorming, and finally (4) molding the list of problems into research
programs that will contribute to solutions for industry problems/needs in
this area. The following writeup represents the consensus of the working
group participants listed in Appendix C of this report.
The working group realized early in the working session that definitions
(failure, hard fault, soft fault, failure mode, etc.) were needed so professionals
with different backgrounds could proceed effectively with the stat('d task. It
was decided that the following definitions, some of which have been proposed
as 1EEE standards, would be used by the working group.
1. VEHICLE: Highest level component.
2. SYSTEM: Second highest level component.
3. FAILURE MECHANISM: A mechanism that could produce a fail-
ure (metal migration,voltage overstress, lack of grease, etc.)
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4. FAULT: Phenomenological reason for a failure (open wire, stuck-at-1
fault, stuck-at-0 fault, design fault, mechanical friction, etc.)
5. FAILURE: Deviation of behavior from specification (arithmetic func-
tion failure, storage failure, flight control function failure, etc.)
6. HARD FAILURE: The same as a permanent failure. Repeated use of
the same input and same initial conditions results in the same incorrect
response
7. SOFT FAILURE: The same as a temporary failure. Repeated use of
the same input and same initial conditions does not result in the same
response
8. LATENT FAILURE: Fault has occurred, error has not occurred.
9. FAILURE MODE: A failure and the associated symptoms [pilot
taking a nap while plane nose-dives (human failure mode), unwanted
movement of ailerons (system failure mode), unwanted flight control
command (subsystem failure mode), etc.]
10. ERROR: Deviation of device's state from correct state [pilot fails to
note that plane is in a nose-dive (human error), erroneous position of
ailerons (system error), erroneous signal from flight controller (subsys-
tem error), etc.]
2.5.2 Critical Issues
Throughout the working session, the working group identified various tech-
nology issues that relate to the use of electronics in flight-critical systems.
The list of issues include environmental threats, the existence of new failure
modes, test techniques, validation/certification, and modeling. These issues
appear immediately below in outline form.
• Environmental threats
High Energy Electromagnetic Environment (EME)
• Lightning (direct strike)
• High frequency RF (HERF)
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• Electromagneticpulse(EMP)
NuclearEMP
Lightning EMP
• High energy nuclear particles that causesingleevent upset
(SEU)
• Temperature & humidity
• Vibration
• Failure modes of new technologies
- CMOS/SOS
- Gallium arsenide
- Room temperature superconductors
- VHSIC/VLSIC
• Failure modes at various levels of system hierarchy
- transistor level
- gate level
- board/module level
- subsystem level
- system level
• Relationship between failure modes and functional demands
• Energy required to upset or damage a component
• Testing procedures
Research & development
Manufacturing
Field
techniques for fault detection/isolation
nonconcurrent test techniques (off-line testing)
• Test
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- _:oncurrentechniques(on-line testing)
- functional testing
- behavioraltesting
• Tro_bleshooting
- Fault detection
- Fault isolation
- Repair& retest
• Validation certification integration criteria
- ltow does one validate a system?
- ltow does one validate a component of a system?
- flow does one certify that a module performs as inten&,d?
- How does one assure that the module is compatible with other
modules in the system':
• Modeling problems
- device modeling
- fault modeling
- component stress (over a period of time)
• Problems encountered when handling products
- Electrostatic discharge (ESD)
- Shock & vibration
- Effect of temperature and humidity
2.5.3 Research Needs
2.5.3.1 General Needs During a brainstorming session, thirteen re-
search problems were identified by the working group. These problems, which
refle_ t indtlstry needs as perceived by the working group, are presented below.
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1. Establish electromagnetic environment (EME) internal to aircraft that
results from external electromagnetic environment.
• Obtain experimental data (data base)
• Develop analytical results
• Demonstration
2. Develop certification/integration criteria for digital systems.
3. Explore component trends and EME sensitivities.
4. Study chip level testing (functional test in a known environment).
• Static/dynamic tests
• Error detection and correction (EDAC)
• System test interface
5. Update MIL- STD-HDBK-217E (F).
• Add new parts (VHSIC/VLSIC, Josephson devices, etc.)
• Include fault data (hard and soft faults)
• Include failure mode data (including probability of failure mode
occurrence)
MIL-STD-HDBK-217 or its equivalent is the basis for failure rate pre-
diction. However, it does not include information on transients and
intermittents which represent roughly 50-90% of failures. Thus, infor-
mation contained in the existing document is the tip-of-the-iceberg.
A program is thus needed to supply the missing data. If not done,
reliability modeling is of limited value.
6. Establish Testability Program.
• Manufacturing test
• Field test
• Functional fault models for system lesting
• Faih, re mode modeling
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7. Defineand investigatereasons why fly-by-wire systems fail.
• Multiple independent faults (never observed)
• Single point failures (observed some times)
• Domino failures (most common?)
Most research has been aimed at multiple independent faults, but it is
the other two that appear to be the real problem. A program is needed
to confirm this observation so that research, development, and design
resources are allocated to the right problem.
8. Verify that present redundancy techniques are adequate.
9. Fiber optics (life testing).
10. What is the probability of a Byzantine failure? Is the probability of a
Byzantine failure high enough to require specific architectures? With-
out knowing this, design decisions will .have to be made by flipping
a coin. A program is thus needed to determine this probability and
answer additional sensitivity questions such as: Does increasing clock
rates, which decrease timing margins and increase metastability rates,
cause an increase in Byzantine failures?
Note: A Byzantine failure is any failure that produces different symp-
toms for different observers. For example, a flip-flop that outputs a
signal that lies between 0 and 1 can be interpreted as a zero by some
downstream devices and as a 1 by other downstream devices. Byzan-
tine failures are more commonly related to timing. They also tend to be
single point failures, and in such case the probability of system failure
cannot be lower than that of the associated Byzantine failure.
11. Methods exist for detecting many degraded conditions in non-electrical
components (detect vibration, bearing noise, crack in metal, etc.).
However, methods have not been developed for detecting degraded con-
ditions in electrical systems. Thus, advanced methods are needed for
detecting degraded electrical components before they fail. Two possible
approaches are the use of analog techniques and/or the use of failure
history.
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12. Determine the percentage of failures that are hard/soft in existing sys-
tems.
• Data to be supplied by industry
• Create data base for use by industry
13. Investigate failure mechanisms for new technologies.
2.5.3.2 Suggested Research Programs The primary objective of the
failure modes working group was to identify three groups of problems to be
addressed by NASA. In the first group are urgent problems where there is
not time to mount a research program and for which some interim solution
is the best result that can he expected. The second group consists of longer
term problems that are amenable to being addressed by deliberate research
programs. The third group consists of problems that may become important
at some time in the future. These three groups of problems are identified
in the sections immediately below as (a) short term research effort, (b) long
term research programs, and (c) future research problems.
2.5.3.2.1 Suggested Short Term Research Effort The working
group concluded that all problems identified in section 3.5 are very important
and should be part of a long term or future program. This being the case,
no short term research efforts were identified by the working group.
2.5.3.2.2 Suggested Long Term Research Programs By analyz-
ing the research problems (brainstorming output) presented in section 3.5,
the working group identified three long term research programs. Program #1
was created by combining research problems 1, 2, and 9. Program #2 con-
sists of research problems 3 and 5, and Program #3 is comprised of research
problems 3 and 4. These three long term programs are further described
immediately below.
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Certification and Integration Criteria (Long Term Program #1)
EME/HERF internal environments
* Perform tests to determine internal environment caused by HERF,
lightning and other external EM environments (some data does presently
exist)
- Engine nacelles
- Fuselage
- Cockpits
• Perform any additionalvehicle/component teststo achieve the needed
degree of comprehensiveness in the EME response data bases
Formulate a data base from the above tests
Determine the transferfunctionsthat relatethe internaland external
environments in typicalaircraftstructures
Develop a national resource analysis capability that includes the various
transfer processes (functions/models) from the external environment to
the digital circuits that provide the needed data processing/functions
(environment, aircraft exterior, aircraft interior, cables, equipment en-
closures, circuits, etc.)
Develop methods to assess the impact of the internal environment on
systems
- Test methods
- Analysis methods
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Design/Verification
Develop methods to verify adequacy of hardware and software designs
to prevent system functional upset due to the EME/HERF internal
environments. This will include test and analysis methods which are
needed to verify protection against upset in the lightning multiple stroke
and multiple burst environments (How much protection is enough?).
Determine the degree of comprehensiveness of system representation
in the test configurations needed for flight-critical systems verifica-
tion/validation.
Life Testing
Perform accelerated life testing on fiber optics to determine sensitiv-
ity to EME and low level radiation and vibration environments (also
consider thermal sensitivity, embrittlement, opacity, etc.).
Note: Long term program #1 should be carried out in cooperation with
other organizations in the United states and Europe (e.g., FAA, DOD, RTCA,
SAE committees AE4L and AE4R, EUROCAE, IEEE, and major airframe
manufacturers).
Testing (Long Term Research Program #2)
Troubleshooting and Repair
Smarter diagnostic aids are required to reduce trouble shooting and
LRU turn around times. One possibilily is to store acceptance test
software in the system, and download the software into a PC, for field
testing; this could enhance testing and at the same time reduce the
amount of special test equipment required for field testing. Study is
required to provide verification of effecliveness and cost savings at-
tributable to test software LRU loading and standard test busses (e.g.,
IEEE 488).
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Error-detecting/correcting (EDAC) codes
• Most digital systems do not presently utilize EDAC codes that carry
wordlength penalty that increases with detection/correction capability
of the code. A study is requested to demonstrate reduced mean time
between unit removals due to the use of EDAC or other concurrent
in-flight monitoring, and cost effectiveness.
Fault injection guidelines
• Guidelines are requested for injecting faults to assess performance and
capabilities of fault detection techniques and diagnosis of prototypes in
a laboratory environment.
Component Trends (Long Term Program #3)
Empirical Data
* An on-going test program to provide empirical data on new families of
digital devices is requested. Such data needs to define Energy thresh-
olds such as speed-power product Pd • rd and failure modes for new
devices (damage thresholds, upset thresholds, degradation thresholds,
etc.). This data should be maintained in a national resource data base.
Update MIL- STD-HDBK-217E (F)
• Add new parts (VHSIC/VLSIC, Josephson devices, etc.)
• Include fault data (hard and soft faults)
• Include failure mode data (including probability of failure mode occur-
rence)
Provide guidance for interpreting empirical data (relate empirical data
from standardized waveforms to various waveforms produced by asso-
ciated EME).
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2.5.3.2.3 Suggested Future Research Programs Future research
problems identified by the working group consist of those problems in section
3 (problems 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13) that were not included in the long term
research programs of section 4. These problems are listed immediately below
(A through F) for completeness.
A. Define and investigate reasons why fly-by-wire systems fail.
(a) Multiple independent faults (never observed)
(b) Single point failures (observed some times)
(c) Domino failures (most common?)
Most research has been aimed at multiple independent faults, but it is
the other two that appear to be the real problem. A program is need
to confirm this observation so that research, development, and design
resources are allocated to the right problem.
B. Verify that present redundancy techniques are adequate.
C. What is the probability of a Byzantine failure? Is the probability of a
Byzantine failure high enough to require specific architectures? With-
out knowing this, design decisions will have to be made by flipping
a coin. A program is thus needed to determine this probability and
answer additional sensitivity questions such as: Does increasing clock
rates, which decrease timing margins and increase metastability rates,
cause an increase in Byzantine failures?
D. Develop advanced analog techniques for detecting degraded compo-
nents before they fail.
E. Determine the percentage of faults/failures that are hard/soft in exist-
ing systems.
(a) data to be supplied by industry
(b) create data base for use by industry
F. Investigate failure mechanisms for new t,'chnologies.
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2.6 System Modeling
2.6.1 Introduction and Overview
2.6.1.1 Motivation and Goals The industry representatives in this
working group are looking for tools and techniques that will assist them in
the design of fault-tolerant systems. They are aware of the reliability tools
that have been developed at NASA-LaRC, and look to LaRC for guidance
on what the tools can do and how they can be applied to their problems,
as well as for instruction on how to use the tools. They are also interested
in the research and techniques/tools that LaRC is developing to gather the
data required as input to the reliability tools. Currently, industry is having
great difficulty in selecting the proper tool for a given problem and applying
it correctly. The lack of a coherent and unified presentation of how the wide
variety of tools relate to each other, and how to properly exploit the richness
of this variety has greatly limited the effectiveness of all the tools. The tool
builders must address this issue for the tools to be accepted and used.
2.6.1.2 Industry Needs The need exists in industry for modeling and
tools to support fast development of responses to RFP's, system design, and
trade-off studies. Modeling is required during the design of fanlt-tolerant sys-
tems to translate high-level requirements into system/architecture require-
ments, to improve productivity during the design process, to provide a means
of fleshing-out preliminary designs, and to provide justification for the result-
ing design. Modeling is also required to conduct trade-off studies between
different designs with respect to attaining system requirements within spec-
ified constraints, especially cost constraints. To perform the required mod-
eling, techniques that are developed should be embedded in tools. The tools
in turn must be easy to use, accurate, validated, and efficient. It was the
consensus of this working group that no tool currently meets these needs and
that industry quite clearly can recognize a tool that meets their needs.
Tile current reliability tools may be adequate for most of industry's prob-
lems, but they must be made more easy to use and apply to a given problem.
The current tools do provide an adequate base for extension into analysis ar-
eas that industry expects to be high growth areas, such as performance and
cost analysis; however, a much tighter interaction between the industry users
and the NASA model builders is required for current and future investment
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in tool developmentto be justified.
2.6.2 Critical Issues
Ultimately, industry feels that an integrated tool environment is needed to
aid them both in quickly deciding between competing system designs and
in completing the design and assessment of a target system. However, the
primary focus of the working group discussions was (1) what tools exist for
reliability analysis, (2) what methods and internal models are they based on,
(3) how are they used, (4) how can the user be certain that he has accurately
matched a tool to his system and accurately input a system representation
to the tool, and (5) how can the user be confident of the results computed by
the tool. The iterative process of modeling a system for reliability analysis
and modifying it based on the results of the model analysis is illustrated in
Figure 1. In this process, understanding the system means to understand
the types of faults the system is subject to, what effects the faults have on
the system, and how the system can detect, isolate, and recover from faults.
This understanding of the system is essential in selecting a tool that can
properly represent the system and compute a solution. Once the tool has
been selected, the appropriate input model(s) has to be created. The model
can then be evaluated, and the results used to determine if modifications to
the system are necessary.
The reliability tool builders see themselves involved in an iterative de-
velopment - as new fault tolerant systems are designed, they modify their
tools to handle the new modeling needs. The users' primary concern is that
the tools demand too much knowledge of a given technique, such as Markov
modeling, and provide little support for judging the validity of their results.
Some of the current means used by members of this group to validate the
results include using several tools and comparing the results, and comput-
ing hand solutions of simplified models as a comparison. The members of
the group also feel that there should be more explicit guidelines as to which
modeling techni(lues arc appropriate for various systems. There was general
consensus that the tools perform the numerical computations correctly, but
uncertainity as to correct interpretation and application of the tool mod-
els by the users. The users are also concerned about validating the system
models they create and the difficulty of attaining the data required for input
parameters to the tools. In general, it seems that the users and the tool
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builders differ in their expectationsof userexpertise in the various model-
ing techniquesand applicationsof the varioustools to particular problems.
Also, the disagreementsamongvarioustool developersabout the utility and
applicationsof certain techniquesand the real usesto which their tools will
beapplied add to the doubtsof the usercommunity asto whetheror not the
current tools meet their needs.
The topics identified for discussionby the working group were
• What tools areavailable
• Howto modelcomplexsystems
• How to modelcoverage
• How to compile,compute,and/or estimatedata neededfor model pa-
rameters
• What are the issuesin tool development
- Developmentof graphical inputs
- Designationof beta test sites
- Determination of what is needed
- Determination of who developswhat
- Identification of industry needs
• What are the mathematical issues
• How can tools be usedfor quick justification of designdecisions
• Performancemodeling
• Cost modeling
I How can designand evaluation be integrated
• How to verify systemmodels that are cr('atedas input to tools
• How to verify results from tools
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2.6.3 Research Needs
As a result of the working group discussions, issues were identified that the
industry representatives felt should be addressed, possibly by LaRC. The
issues were categorized as urgent issues that should be resolved within a
year, research issues that should be started now and resolved within 5 years,
and long term research issues with no timetable for resolution.
2.6.3.1 Urgent Issues The focus of the urgent issues is to exploit the
full power of the reliability tools currently available from NASA by enhancing
the information that is available about the tools, by creating guidelines for
their use, and by continuing research on data collection for model inputs. It
was felt that an industry/NASA workshop should be held so that a more
precise and detailed identification could be made of the type and scope of
the problems and applications that industry wants to model than currently
exists. The successful completion of the following actions is essential to the
full utilization of the current tools:
• the development of guidelines for matching application to tool for all
NASA tools
• the development of guidelines for selecting coverage representation and
parameters
the creation of an example-based user's guide for each tool that would
show how to use that tool through an evolutionary presentation of each
of its features
• the development of explicit guidelines for a user to confirm that a model
or a tool's output conforms with his input and intentions
• the provision of tutorials directed at the application of the tools to the
user's specific problem area
the (ontinuation and expansion of experiments and data collection to
determine model inputs, particularly focused on the internal processes
relating to coverage
• the active and continuing confirmation by NASA that the above actions
focus on and apply directly to the industry users' needs.
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2.6.3.2 Research Issues The researchissuesto bestartednow andcom-
pleted within 5 years wereselectedwith the goal of improving the power
and productivity of NASA's current tools. First, to increasethe use and
valueof the tools, they shouldbe mademoreportable; easierto usethrough
the addition of prompts, library functions, sophisticatedon-line help facili-
ties, graphical and textual input, user-specifieddefaults, input consistency
checks,and facilities for flexibleoutput manipulation. To increasethe user's
confidencein the tool results and to improve the user's ability to validate
modelsand outputs, the tools should be modified to automatically bound
all internal modelingand numericalapproximations,to tell the userwhy the
answeris what it is, and to include more graphic output capabilities. In-
formation on why a certain answerresulted can provide design insight as
well as permit confirmation of tool usage. Finally, to make a start toward
an integrated tool environment, NASA-LaRC should select an appropriate
input format or vocabulary for reliability modeling tools and develop and/or
acquire performance modeling and evaluation tools.
2.6.3.3 Long-Term Research Issues For the long term, NASA should
initiate the research that will be required to extend and integrate individual
"ility" tools into an environment for supporting all phases of system de-
sign. Capabilities need to be added to individual tools to assist in making
informed decisions with respect to a particular "ility" in the design optimiza-
tion process. However, these capabilities have to be selected and developed
to complement and interact with those of other tools. In particular, the
interactions and tradeoffs between reliability and performance need to be
identified for integration into general performability tools.
For reliability estimation, research is needed to develop a tool that can
selectively create fault tree, markov, or simulation models from a unified,
high-level input language, solve that model and produce output in a unified
and descriptive format.
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2.7 Reliable Software
2.7.1 Introduction & Overview
The Software Reliability Working Group was composed of 21 members who
met on December 12 and 13, 1988 to discuss and evaluate the important
research issues in this area.
Most of our efforts were spent on defining and listing the various issues
associated with this area. The group discussed the importance of software
issues within a system context, rather than as a separate entity divorced from
the hardware issues. As an example, we considered hardware and software
coupled issues as falling within our area. If a system contained three comput-
ers (hardware) with a hardware voter to form a triple modular redundancy
(TMR) scheme and identical versions of the software on each computer, this
was considered hardware fault tolerance and was not addressed in our dis-
cussion. However, if the voting rule was an algorithm programmed on a
microprocessor, then we classified the system as a software implementation
of hardware redundancy and included this as a topic in our area. Similarly,
if there were system issues which related to both hardware and software, we
considered these as well.
The group discussed definitions of terms when necessary, to reach a com-
mon understanding. The term software fault tolerance is used to refer to
software algorithms that implement hardware fault tolerance, whereas the
term fault-tolerant software is used to refer to schemes to mask software
faults, such as n-version programming and recovery blocks. Also, as is evi-
denced in the research literature, a lot of members had different ideas about
the meaning of Verification, Validation and Test (VV&T). To allow for the
broadest meaning of this term, the group used it to encompass all activities
various people associated with the term.
It was noted that VV&T of software has traditionally been a difficult task
in that it absorbs a large portion of development resources, it is difficult to
formulate a well-defined methodology for effective testing, and it is difficult to
identify which system failures are due to software faults. VV&T is especially
difficut in the case of fault-tolerant systems where one wishes failure rates of
10 -9 per hour. These very low failure rates make the problem of software,
hardware, and system VV&T very difficult.
We spent less of our time on our attempts to classify and rank the 42
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research and advanced development issues which we defined. These issues
are grouped under the 6 major categories given in section 2.7.2: however,
there is some overlap between categories. We voted on the importance and
time needed for investigation of each issue. Importance was ranked as high
(H), medium (M), or low (L). The time needed was categorized as up to two
years (2), five years (5), or 10 years (10). These rankings appear to the left of
each issue. In most cases, a consensus was reached on the rankings. In a few
cases there was a substantial split, and in such cases both opinions are listed.
For example, a ranking of (H-5,2) means that almost all agreed that the issue
was of high priority and most thought it to be a five-year issue; however, a
substantial minority thought it could be accomplished in two years.
Time did not permit a second round of rethinking of the issues and a
grouping of them into a number of coherent interrelated research programs.
If this had been done, some of the rankings might have changed a bit. For
example, if a two-year issue of medium priority was found to be necessary
to collect data to be used in a five-year issue of high priority, then the two-
year issue would become high priority. Twenty four (57%) of the issues were
rated of high priority, twelve (29%) of medium priority, and the remaining
six (14%) were of low priority.
Subsequent to the workshop, all participant.s were provided with a rough
draft of the categorized issues, and were asked to vote for the ten top is-
sues among the 24 high priority items. The participants (NASA employees
excluded) were then polled by telephone for their votes. Ten of the 11 r_'-
sponded. These were averaged according to the following ranking schem,':
the most important issue was rated as 10, the next most as 9, down to the
10th issue, which was rated as 1 (one respondent only ranked the top five
issues). Issues which were not ranked in the top ten received a score of zero.
The top nine issues (highest average scores) are listed in Section 2.7.3.2. All
the 24 high priority issues received at least one vote; however, only those with
an average score of 2.7 or higher appear in Section 2.7.3.2 and each of these
issues received votes from either 4, 5, 6, or 7 out of the nine respondents.
(Assuming a uniform distribution due to random selection, the scores would
have all been 2.3). A smaller number of issues emerge if we read carefully
the descriptions given in Section 2.7.3.2. In a number of cases, the same
issue is being raised from a different viewpoint. As examples, compare the
similarities of: issues 25 and 30, issues 7 and 8, and issues 28 and 33.
On December 14 when each group made their report, a few emphasized
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the importanceof creatinga national data repository. It seemsthat most of
the membersof the group would support the conceptasevidenceby some
of the topics discussed:"Performance,reliability, and availability analysis
of real-world N-versionsystems","Definition, specification,and collection of
reliability data", "Correlatingthe measuredreliability with [variousfactors]",
"Data collectionof fieldedsystemsand lab experiments",as well asothers.
2.7.2 Critical Issues
During the working group meetings, a first draft of an outline of categories
was created. These categories were meant to span all detailed issues dis-
cussed. The working group had time to place most but not all issues within
the categories. Following the working group meeting, the remaining issues
were categorized. To adequately incorporate these remaining issues, the cat-
egories were slightly modified; the outline below shows the resulting catego-
rization.
SOFTWARE RELIABILITY WORKING GROUP RESEARCH ISSUES
• SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS
- Fault-Tolerant Software Techniques
- Hardware and Software Integration Issues
• RELIABILITY/AVAILABILITY/SAFETY ANALYSIS OF SOFTWARE
- Reliability Growth Models
- Common Mode (Coincident Error) Models
- Metrics
- Development; VV_:T
- Safety and Risk
• DATA COLLECTION
- Fielded Systems
- Lab Experiments
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• SOFTWARE TESTING AND EFFECTIVENESS
- Evaluation
- Coverage Criteria
• SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES
- Evaluation
- Paradigms
- Language Issues
- Tools
• CERTIFICATION AND STANDARDS
2.7.3 Research Needs
2.7.3.1 Research Issues Identified The following annotated list sets
forth the forty-two issues identified by the working group. The issues are
presented within the category framework delineated in the previous section.
Immediately preceding each issue, a priority and time rating is given, in the
format <Priority>-<Time>, according to the following scheme. Priority was
assigned based on the participants' assessment of the urgency in the need for
research results to guide government and commercial endeavors to predict,
measure, and ensure the reliability of flight-critical software.
PRIORITY
H: High
M: Medium
L: Low
TIME
2: up to 2 years to complete
5: from 2 to 5 years to complete
10: from 5 to 10 years to complete
• SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS
- FAULT-TOLERANT SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES
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1. (H-2) Definition, properties (robustness, convergence, etc.),
and analysis of various voting strategies (as used in N-version,
recovery blocks, adaptive, on-line & spares, repair, etc.). For
the various voting strategies proposed for fault-tolerant software, it
would be beneficial to have a common basis for their definition and
delim,ation of their various properties. Then, the strategies could be
analyzed (e.g., performance and reliability) and compared for potential
applications.
'2. (H-2) Examine the effects of reduced levels of verification,
validation, and test (VV&T) on the reliability of fault-tolerant
software systems. Fault-tolerant software has been proposed in order
to protect against software faults. It has also been suggested that
this development technique could reduce the need for certain VV&T
activities on the individual versions. The relationships between the
VV&T of the versions, the fault-tolerant software strategy, and the
overall systems resultant reliability characteristics must be investigated.
3. (H-5) Cost-benefit analysis and selection criteria for various
fault-tolerant software techniques. The bottom line for the accep-
tance of any new technology is cost. Given various voting strategies,
VV&'T techniques, and reliability characteristics, analysis capabilities
are needed that will assess the costs and benefits of various N-version
techniques and allow for quantitative comparisons and selection crite-
ria.
4. (H-5) Performance, reliability, and availability analysis of
real-world fault-tolerant software systems. Data from fielded
systems should be used to analyze the effectiveness of implemented N-
version systems in achieving their required performance, reliability, and
availability levels.
o (H-10) Guidelines for the development of N-version programs
to minimize common mode (coincident) failures. N-version
software assumes that the individual versions fail independently. To
achieve independent failure, the individual versions are usually pro-
grammed by separate programming teams. Studies have shown that
this approach cannot guarantee independence. Investigations need to
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be conductedwhich can provide the basisfor guidelinesfor the devel-
opmentof N-versionsoftware.
6. (M-2) Defnition and properties of reconfiguration/recovery
techniques. Just as there are various voting techniques to consider
for N-version software, once a vote has been made on non-unanimous
results, it may be necessary to reconfigure or recover the hardware,
software, or system. Work to define reconfiguration and recovery tech-
niques, and to compare the properties of these techniques, is needed.
- HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE INTEGRATION ISSUES
7. (H-5) Interaction and impact of fault-tolerant software on
hardware redundancy management. From a systems viewpoint,
how do fault-tolerant software and redundant hardware systems inter-
act? Specifically, how is the operation of hardware redundancy man-
agement affected when the hardware is overlaid with fault-tolerant soft-
ware? Is there danger of negative synergisms?
8. (H-5) Categorize, validate, and analyze the cost-benefits of
software to manage hardware redundancy. In all current redun-
dant hardware systems, there is some portion of the redundancy man-
agement that is done in software. This type of software has its own
attributes and properties which must be understood and analyzed.
.% (M-2) On-line discrimination between hardware and software
faults. In a fault-tolerant system with recovery, it is imperative that
faults be isolated and identified. When a redundant hardware system
is running fault-tolerant software to protect against software faults,
the discrimination between hardware and software faults i_ necessary
so that proper recovery actions can be taken. If software faults are
thought to be hardware faults, good hardware units will be discarded
and the problem will still remain.
10. (L-2) Redundant hardware (non-lock step) with single soft-
ware version. There are two approaches for allowing tasks (single
version, non-fault-tolerant software) to execute on a redundant hard-
ware system: synchronously (lock step) and asynchronously (non-lock
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step). When task execution is asynchronous,then the job of fault re-
coverybecomesmorecomplicatedthan whentasksrun synchronously.
11. (L-5) How to design flight-critical software to be independent
of underlying hardware. In order to make flight software usable
across airframes and across different vendors hardware, it would be
desirable to make software independent of the underlying hardware.
This would also reduce the overhead for certification and recertification.
12. (L-IO) Validation of non-deterministic scheduling of tasks.
There are two approaches to the scheduling of tasks: deterministic
(according to predefined task schedule tables) and non-deterministic.
When scheduling is non-deterministic, the order of task execution will
be affected by various factors and thus result in tasks being executed
in a random order. These factors must be determined along with their
effects on the order of tasks and the execution of the system.
• RELIABILITY AVAILABILITY SAFETY ANALYSIS OF
SOFTWARE
- RELIABILITY GROWTH MODELS
13. (M-2) Investigate the correlations among wall clock time,
CPU time, input space, and test vectors for software reliabil-
ity modeling. Software reliability growth model describe the relia-
bility of software as a function of time (i.e., clock or cpu time) or the
number of executions (i.e., number of inputs or test vectors). There has
been some discussion in the research literature concerning the appro-
priate unit of "time" for reliability estimation. Some models appear to
work better for one unit over another. Controlled investigation needs
to be conducted to resolve this issue.
14. (M-2) Unified hardware, software, and systems reliability
models. From an overall systems point of view, very little, if any,
work has been done to enable the estimation of the reliability of a total
system, including hardware and software. The pursuit of software re-
liability models without regard to the total system context could limit
the results of this research.
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- COMMON MODE (COINCIDENT ERROR) MODELS
15. (H-2) Coincident Error model analysis. A theoretical basisfor
reliability modeling of redundant softwareand coincident failure has
beendeveloped.Estimation techniquesbasedon this approachneedto
bepursued. Also, this modelingapproachshouldbeusedto investigate
the benefitsand limitations of fault-tolerant software.
- METRICS
16. (H-2) Correlating the measured reliability of the software
with software metrics. Analyses to determine which metric or com-
bination of metrics (such as design and code complexity measures, lines
of code) best predict the observed operational reliability of the software.
- DEVELOPMENT; VV&T
17. (H-5) Correlating the measured reliability of the software
with development strategies and associated VV&T. Data from
fielded systems should be used to establish empirical relationships be-
tween various software development strategies, along with their associ-
ated VV&T techniques, and the resultant measured reliability.
- SAFETY AND RISK
18. (H-2) Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Anal-
ysis. The feasibility and efficacy of these techniques should be in-
vestigated for their application to software. Failure modes and effects
analysis concentrates on identified failure modes, and the effects the
failures have on the software or system. Hazard analysis is a much
broader based activity; it entails identifying conditions and events that
may result in an accident or catastrophe. Hazard analysis may include
failure modes and effects analysis.
19. (M-2) Feasibility of using Software Fault Trees. Investigate
using fault tree analysis to show dependence of software faults, and
from this information develop improved lest cases.
79
20. (M-2) Reliability (Safety) Block Diagrams. A traditional method
for analyzing hardware reliability is to make a model of the system
based on the probability of success paths existing in the system. Such
models are generally referred to as reliability block diagrams or graph
models. They can be used in much the same way as fault trees, to
model the success of system software.
• DATA COLLECTION
- FIELDED SYSTEMS
21. (H-5,2) Definition, specification, and collection of reliability
data. Lack of voluminous, complete data on fielded systems hinders
our knowledge of failure rates, and ability to validate reliability models
and to estimate failure rate parameters for reliability prediction. The
contents of a complete data base of error and reliability data needs to
be defined and specified. Then, a mechanism to facilitate collection,
storage, and access of these data needs to be set up. Note that due to
the low failure rates of fielded flight-crucial systems, large quantities of
data collected over time are needed to further the progress in this area.
22. (H-2) Collection of metric data on systems for correlation
with measured reliability. Fault-tolerant systems have been fielded,
such as the A320, the space shuttle, and the X29A. Fault-tolerant soft-
ware design is being used to increase reliability. Metric and reliability
data from these systems would provide invaluable feedback to the re-
search and user communities. A framework for the collection of these
data is needed. Such data would enable evaluation of development and
VV_:T strategies, modeling approaches, and cost-benefit analyses.
- LAB EXPERIMENTS
23. (tt-5,2) Definition and execution of lab experiments. Experi-
ments can be used to investigate specific issues of concern. In the past,
experiments have provided data on the error rates of software due to
different bugs, the rates of coincident failures in N-version software,
and the strengths of various testing techniques. These studies have
also provided insight on how to collect meaningful data for investigat-
ing software reliability.
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• SOFTWARE TESTING TECHNIQUES AND EFFECTIVENESS
- EVALUATION
24. (H-2) Analysis of error classes and their associated functional
mapping, and appropriate techniques for detections. What
classes of errors are found in flight-critical software? Are more catas-
trophic errors observed in some error classes than in others? Does the
functionality of a software unit map to the classes of errors likely to be
found in that unit? Which testing techniques are better at exposing
each class of errors?
25. (H-5) Cost-benefit comparison of various testing strategies.
How do different criteria compare for selecting input spaces (e.g., error
crystals, fault trees, data partitions) to emphasize in testing? How do
techniques such as dynamic branch testing compare with techniques
such as static structure analysis? Is it worthwhile to place more em-
phasis on formal testing at earlier phases (e.g., unit testing)?
26. (M-5) Stopping rules for VV&T, and their associated metrics.
Testing often stops because of schedule and cost deadlines, rather than
because a technique has been exercised to satisfaction of a technique-
specific stopping rule. Studies to determine reasonable, measurable
stopping rules are needed. In conjunction with these stopping rules,
guidance on the time and cost to budget to accomplish them are needed.
- COVERAGE CRITERIA
27. (H-2) Establish integration test coverage criteria. More quan-
titative guidance is needed for aiding in determining when sufficient
coverage has been obtained during integration testing. For examl_le,
what are adequate coverage criteria for stack depth analysis, data in-
terconnectivity, and timing tests?
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• SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES
- EVALUATION
28. (H-5) Cost-benefit analysis of various software development
strategies (fault avoidance). How do fault avoidance (as opposed to
fault tolerance) development strategies such as Clean room, structured
analysis, Jackson methodology, compare?
29. (H-10) Techniques and tools for requirements/specification
validation. Evaluation of existing tools and techniques (e.g., rapid
prototyping, requirements languages) is needed. Areas for improving
these existing tools and techniques must be identified, as well as iden-
tifying new ones. Then the definition, specification, development, and
assessment of improvements must be undertaken.
30. (H-10) Ways to make single version software more reliable.
Tools to develop test cases; can fault tree analysis be used to show
dependence of faults and be used to generate test cases? A basis for
determining the reliability of software is needed. Work on defining and
developing testing strategies is needed.
31. (L-2) What techniques ensure high levels of programming
quality in light of the fact that VV&T has been separated from
the coder. This addresses the psychological issue of complacency
among some programmers working on self-correcting software (e.g., n-
version, recovery blocks). How can we impress on programmers that
it is extremely important they make their code as reliable as possible,
rath(,r thau rely on error-correcting facilities?
- PARADIGMS
32. (H-5) Design for software testability. Methods are needed for de-
signing software so that it can be tested more effectively and efficiently.
Note that in hardware, design faults are not counted as 'errors'; only
wearout is counted as an error. With software, design flaws are indeed
errors. Also, complexity permitted in hardware is fairly limited. Soft-
ware complexity, and the shared resource environment in software are
big coutributors to error, l,',xl>lore (tesigiling fi)r low COml)lexity , el, c.
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33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
(H-5) Techniques for establishing error containment in soft-
ware. Techniques which lead to preventing errors in noncritical por-
tions of code from corrupting critical portions are needed. Also, con-
tainment of errors within critical portions of code is needed, to ensure
minimum damage/degradation from a given error.
(M-10) Use of formal proof techniques in establishing soft-
ware integrity. There are statistical limitations on the estimation
of reliability of life-critical systems. To quantify ultra-high reliabil-
ity using a life testing approach, a prohibitively large number of test
cases and/or test specimens must be used. Therefore, there is a growing
group in the research community that is advocating the use of alternate
approaches to the validation of ultra-reliable systems. One of the most
powerful such approaches is formal mathematical proof of correctness.
Using this approach, a system is specified in a formal specification lan-
guage and this specification is refined through a series of increasingly
detailed design levels all the way down to actual implementation. At
each step of the process, the current level of the design is mathemati-
cally proven to be consistent with the previous level.
(M-10) What is the role of software reuse in flight-critical
software?. Can this software be easily reused? What about inter-
facing reusable modules with software under development? How can
'robustness' of reusable software be measured and conveyed to potential
reusers?
(M-IO) Collection of a library of reliable modules for reuse.
Research issues include determining if and how software module reuse
can benefit flight-critical software development. Specific areas to ex-
plore include: 1) identifying functionality (modules) which likely can
b(, reused at, less cost than developing new ones, 2) assessing the re-
suiting robustness of the software, and 3) pros and cons of interfacing
reused modules with new code under development.
(L-IO) Establishing software engineering and assurance cri-
teria and methods for artificial intelligence. With the increased
usage of AI methods, the functional dolnain of software will expand
into more life-critical areas. Adaptations to and expansion _,f existiw_g
83
softwareengineeringand assurancecriteria will be required by these
driving technology changes.
- LANGUAGE ISSUES
38. (*_)Effect of various languages (Ada, C) on software reliability.
The issues that should be addressed include the structure, capabilities,
size, and philosophy (e.g., strong typing versus no type checking) of the
language, and the status of the compilers/interpreters available.
- TOOLS
39. (L-2) Tools and techniques for maintaining, enhancing, and
retargeting flight-critical software. What about old undocumented
or poorly documented software? What about software that doesn't
have source code anymore? What about the need to retarget software
when the underlying hardware it was developed for has become obso-
lete?
• CERTIFICATION AND STANDARDS
40. (H-2) Determine requirements for testing of tools.
(a) Development tools: compilers, linkers, code generators, etc.
(b) Monitoring tools: coverage analysis and traceability analysis
(c) Analysis tools: simulators and test case generators
There is a great emphasis on automating the design, development, and
VV&T processes. Automation usually means the use of a tool to do a
function. Thus, software is producing and analyzing software. There-
fore, there must be requirements and guidelines for the testing of these
tools. This area poses some unique challenges when it is considered
that the output of a piece of software is another piece of software or
data about a piece of software.
xAs an oversight, this issue was not rated by the Working Group.
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41.
42.
(H-IO) Institutionalize results of research on software relia-
bility, standards, and guidelines. It has been said that the user
community can lag as much as ten years behind the research commu-
nity. This gap must be closed in the aerospace community, specifically
with respect to software. Ways must be found to get the most im-
portant research results into the hands of those that need them most.
Government agencies, like NASA and FAA, should play a crucial part
in this technology transfer.
(M-IO) Certification procedures for products of tools associ-
ated with emerging software development techniques. Given
that there are many tools available for the design, development and
VV&T of software, it should be possible to formulate certification pro-
cedures which take into account the use of these tools.
2.7.3.2 Nine Most Urgent Issues The following list details the results
of a post-meeting poll of working group attendees, to determine the few most
important issues of the forty two identified.
VOTING CONSENSUS ISSUE
RANK SCORE PRIORITY NUMBER ISSUE
1 5.4 H-2 40 CERTIFICATION AND STANDARDS.
Institutionalize the Results of
Research on Software Reliability
Standards and Guidelines
2 4.4 H-10 30 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
METHODOLOGIES: EVALUATION
Ways to Make Single Version
Software More Reliable
3 3.5 H-5 17 RELIABILITY/AVAILABILIT Y 
SAFETY ANALYSIS OF SOFTWARE:
DEVELOPMENT; VV&T. Correlating the
measured reliability of the software with
development strategies and associated VV&']
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RANK
4
8
9
VOTING
SCORE
3.3
3.4
3.3
3.3
2.8
2.7
CONSENSUS
PRIORITY
H-5
H-5
H-5
H-5
H-5
H-5
ISSUE
NUMBER
3
8
25
33
28
ISSUE
SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT
SYSTEMS: FAULT-TOLERANT SOFTWARE
TECHNIQUES. Cost-benefit analysis
and selection criteriafor various
fault-tolerantsoRware techniques.
SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT
SYSTEMS: HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE
INTEGRATION ISSUES. Categorize,
validate, and analyze the cost/
benefits of software to manage
hardware redundancy
SOFTWARE TESTING TECHNIQUES
AND EFFECTIVENESS: EVALUATION.
Cost-benefit comparison of
various testing strategies
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES:
PARADIGMS. Techniques for establishing
error containment in software.
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES:
EVALUATION. Cost benefit analysis of various
software development strategies (fault-avoidance).
SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT
SYSTEMS: HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE
INTEGRATION ISSUES. Interaction
and impact of fault-tolerantsoftware
on hardware redundancy management.
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2.7.3.3 High-Priority Issues The following three lists are subsets of
the full list of issues presented in the previous section. These lists highlight
the high-priority issues; the first list consists of all H-2 issues; the second, all
H-5 issues; and the third, all H-10 issues.
ISSUES REQUIRING 2 YEARS TO COMPLETE
ISSUE
NUMBER ISSUE
2
15
SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT
SYSTEMS: FAULT-TOLERANT SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES
Definition, properties (robustness,
convergence, etc.) and analysis of various
voting strategies (N-version, recovery blocks,
adaptive, on-line & spares repair, etc.)
SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT
SYSTEMS: FAULT-TOLERANT SOFTWARE TE(,HNIQI:ES
Examine the effects of reduced levels of
verification, validation, and test (VV&:T)
on the reliability of fault-tolerant soft-
ware systems
REIAABILITY/AVAILABILITY/SAFETY ANALYSIS OF
SOFTWARE: COMMON MODE (COINCIDENT ERROR) MODELS
Coincident Error model analysis
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ISSIJE
NUMI_ER
16
18
21
22
24
2_
4(}
ISSUE
RELIABILITY/AVAILABILITY/SAFETY ANAIJYSIS
OF SOFTWARE: METRICS
Correlating the measured reliability of the
software with software metrics.
RELIABILITY/AVAILABILITY/SAFETY ANALYSIS
OF SOFTWARE: SAFETY AND RISK
Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis
DATA COLLECTION: FIELDED SYSTEMS
Definition, specification, and collection
of reliability data
DATA COLLECTION: FIELDED SYSTEMS
Collection of metric data on systems for
correlation with measured reliability
SOFTWARE TESTING TECHNIQUES AND
EFFECTIVENESS: EVALUATION
Analysis of error classes and their associated
functional mapping, and appropriate techniques
for detections
SOFTWARE TESTING TECHNIQUES AND
EFFECTIVENESS: COVERAGE CRITEIHA
Establish integration test coverage criteria
CERTIFICATION AND STANDARDS
Determine requirements for testing of tools
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ISSUES REQUIRING 5 YEARS TO COMPLETE
ISSUE
NUMBER ISSUE
4
17
SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT
SYSTEMS: FAULT-TOLERANT SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES
Cost-benefit analysis and selection criteria
for various fault-tolerant software techniques
SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT
SYSTEMS: FAULT-TOLERANT SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES
Performance, reliability, and availability
analysis of real-world N-version systems
SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS:
HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE INTEGRATION ISSUES
Interaction and impact of fault-tolerant software
on hardware redundancy management
SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS:
HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE INTEGRATION ISSUES
Categorize, validate, and analyze the cost-benefits
of software to manage hardware redundancy
RELIABILITY/AVAILABILITY/SAFETY ANALYSIS
OF SOFTWARE: METRICS
Correlating the measured reliability of the
software with development strategies and
associated VV_T
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ISSUE
NUMBER
21
23
25
28
32
33
ISSUE
DATA COLLECTION: FIELDED SYSTEMS
Definition, specification, and collection
of reliability data
DATA COLLECTION: FIELDED SYSTEMS
Definition and execution of lab experiments
SOFTWARE TESTING TECHNIQUES AND
EFFECTIVENESS: EVALUATION
Cost-benefit comparison of various testing
strategies
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES:
EVALUATION
Cost-benefit analysis of various software
development strategies (fault avoidance)
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES:
PARADIGMS
Design for software testability
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES:
PARADIGMS
Techniques for establishing error containment
in software
9O
ISSUES REQUIRING 10 YEARS TO COMPLETE
ISSUE
NUMBER ISSUE
SOFTWARE ISSUES IN FAULT-TOLERANT
SYSTEMS: FAULT-TOLERANT SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES
Guidelines for the development of N-version
programs to minimize common mode (coincident)
failures
29 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES:
EVALUATION
Techniques and tools for requirements/
specification validation
30 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES:
EVALUATION
Ways to make single version software more reliable
41 CERTIFICATION AND STANDARDS
Institutionalize results of research on software
reliability, standards, and guidelines
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2.8 Flight Test
2.8.1 Introduction and Overview
2.8.1.1 Motivation The Flight Testing working group was established
to determine the areas in which flight testing can be used to verify the per-
formance and safety aspects of avionic systems that cannot be adequately
accomplished by analysis, simulation, and laboratory testing, as well as the
ways that flight test results can be applied to improve these other types of
testing. Flight testing is expensive compared to simulations, but simulations
do not provide sufficient confidence to be accepted without confirmation by
flight testing. It may be possible to use flight testing to improve the confi-
dence level of simulations and thus reduce the cost of testing and approving
new systems.
2.8.1.2 Goals The goals of the flight testing working group were to iden-
tify research areas that would help industry reduce the cost and improve the
reliability of digital system design by appropriate use of flight testing. Not
only were research areas identified, but possible research directions were gen-
erated that might aid in accomplishing these goals. The flight testing session
also developed a list of areas in which flight testing is important. This list
is separated according to system integrity issues and system functionality
issues. In addition, a list of possible candidate experimental test systems
was generated that would be useful in testing and improving present tools
and methods. This list of candidate systems should serve as a starting point
from which a research project could be developed.
2.8.1.3 Industry Needs Industry has sew_ral needs for research in sup-
port of flight test activities, including standardized flight critical design
methodologies and verification tools that NASA-LaRC should be able to
provide. These capabilities must allow for design innovation and the contin-
uing improvements in the verification methods and tools themselves. Models
need to be developed for many environmental conditions that are poorly un-
derstood, such as wind shear, turbulence, lightning, and atmospheric effects
on radio frequency ( RF ) and electro-optical ( E-O ) guidance sensors. In
turn, flight testing can be used to support research in other technological
areas, a._ in developing methodologies for building digital systems and tile
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tools for implementing these methodologies.
A method for using flight testing to improve design techniques arid tools
was discussed by the working group and is shown schematically in Figure
4 presented below. Present techniques and tools are used to design and
model a system, then testing ( including flight testing ) is conducted to verify
performance and integrity. The differences between the model predictions
and the actual performance are used as a basis for improvements to methods
and tools. The process is then repeated to continue improvements in methods
and tools as technology improves and new problems arise. Much of the testing
could be done by industry during development of new systems, with the data
collected during this testing being stored and organized by NASA-LaRC for
later use by all of industry.
2.8.1.4 Industry Support Industry presently conducts flight testing of
all systems that are to be certified and released for use; government agencies
monitor, review, and verify test data to decide whether or not to certify a
system for in-service use. Much of the flight testing being conducted may be
redundant and the methods of testing are often re-invented by each company
conducting flight tests. If NASA-LaRC were to develop a general data base
of design verification methodologies and tools that was available to all orga-
nizations conducting flight testing, it could reduce the cost of development
of new systems. The initial data base may be the current industry flight
test simulation / correlation methods and tools. For the proposed data base
to be useful, there would have to be industry and certifying agency support
to not only contribute data to the system, but to utilize the data stored by
NASA-LaRC in future developments as well.
2.8.1.5 Links to Other Verification Methods An obvious link of
flight testing to other design verification methods is the link to simulation.
Flight testing can be used to improve the models for later simulations, and
also to confirm that present models are accurate. Simulation and flight test-
ing must be used in complementary and efficient ways to improve the tech-
niques for modeling and testing systems. With the current rate of technology
growth, testing and modeling methods and tools must be improved to reduce
development costs while ensuring that the performance and integrity require-
ments of tlle systems are met.
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2.8.2 Critical Issues
Of the issues discussed during the working group, the following were of con-
siderable interest:
• Improved design, test, evaluation, and verification processes that are
used broadly by industry and government,
• Environmental information,
• The roles of testing versus simulation,
• System Functionality, and
• System Integrity.
Each of these issues is highly interrelated, and thus one or more of them
appears to some extent among the research needs listed later. Research ideas
were discussed that might lead to improvements in each of these areas. One
of the major issues discussed was the ways to verify the tools being used
during development and ways that feedback from the flight testing phase
might be used to improve these tools. Some care needs to be taken to assure
that development and testing are done in ways that may later be used to
improve each other.
2.8.3 Research Needs
2.8.3.1 Near-Term Needs
Verification Methodologies NASA-LaRC should develop new method-
ologies, and improve existing ones, for verifying the performance and
integrity of flight-critical digital systems that could then be used as the
industry standards. These verification methodologies could utilize the
advantages of flight testing in the verification process. Some possible
areas to which flight testing could be applied include comparing the
reliability of single version software systems versus redundant software
systems, and the reliability of similar systems versus dissimilar systems
in a redundant software environment. NASA-LaRC should not be in-
volved with the development of specific flight-critical systems; rather,
NASA-LaRC should develop tools for building flight-critical systems.
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Pilot inputs, sensors] On-lineFBW/L
system
T
To actuators
rI
Off-line
FBW/L
system
Experiment support system
• Fault injection
• Data collection
• Configuration control
Figure 5: Experimental FBW/L System Test Bed
Verification Tools The new, or improved, w_rification methodologies will
require new, or improved, tools to aid in their use. At a minimum,
some standard type of data base needs to be defined such that the
design tools will work together to aid design optimization, information
transfer, and maintenance from one organization to another.
Test Bed A general-purpose flight test bed needs to be developed that
would allow the verification methods and tools themselves to be veri-
fied. The test bed would also allow new systems to be operated on-line
or off-line with existing on-board systems. For example, if a new flight
critical system or system element is developed, it could be installed on
the test bed aircraft in parallel to the present system. Testing would
then reflect "live" conditions without risking the aircraft or crew on
an untested system. Figure 5 shows schematically the organization of
a test bed aircraft. The test bed for parallel systems also allows for
testing of systems in degraded modes wil hout risk to aircraft or crew.
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Designing for Testability From the beginning of the design of a system,
provisions need to be made for later testing of the system. These
provisions include additional windows into systems without impacting
performance and safety, but which may improve producibility and in-
service maintenance.
2.8.3.2 Longer Term Needs
Environmental Models NASA-LaRC should develop, verify, and upgrade
models of environmental conditions that would then be used by indus-
try in developing new sensors and systems. NASA-LaRC would also
serve as the "clearinghouse" for this information as well as any feedback
provided by industry using these models.
NASA's role as a "clearinghouse" would include the functions of col-
lecting and storing data generated by various members of the industrial
community. Some of the types of information in this data base might
include: lightning, High Energy Radio Frequency ( HERF ) effects, tur-
bulence, wind shear, precipitation, etc. NASA-LaRC would also keep
the most recent versions of design, verification, and testing tools and
would also serve to insure that all newly developed tools met certain
standards and thus could communicate with each other. This data base
of information and these tools would be available to all members of the
industrial community for use in developing new flight-critical digital
systems.
How much testing Just as verification methodologies need to be developed
or improved, testing methodologies need to be improved and investi-
gated. The major issues raised concerning flight testing are concerning
which systems / elements are to be tested, when sufficient testing has
been accomplished to satisfy regulatory and operational requirements,
and to quantify the level of confidence available in the test results.
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2.8.4 List of System FunctionaLity Issues
( Not Prioritized )
System
• Redundancy Management / Failure Detection, Isolation, and Recon-
figuration ( FDIR )
• Lightning/HERF
• Design Errors / Model Accuracy
• Hardened Stability Augmentation
Software
• Ada / Real Time Issues
• Dissimilar Software
• Automated DeveLopment Tools
Computer
• High Reliability Architectures
• Timing Tolerances
• Transient Recovery Capability
• Technology ( Electronic, Fluidic, etc. )
• Similar / Dissimilar
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Sensors
• Solid State
• Skewed
• Analytical Redundancy
Actuators
• Smart Actuation ( Electrohydrostatic ( E-H ), Electromechanical ( E-
M ), Electrical or Mechanical? ( EOM ) )
• Integrated Actuators ( Local Power )
• Fault Characteristics
Communications
• OpticM
• Protocol
Power ( Electrical / Hydraulic)
• Centralized / Distributed
• Dissimilarity
• Uninterruptible / Redundancy? Management
Pilot / Vehicle Interface
• Head Up / Down Functional Displays
• Reconfiguration
• Controller Operation
• Caution / Warning Displays
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2.8.5 List of System Integrity Issues
( Not Prioritized )
• Command / Stability Augmentation Control Law Concepts
• Envelope Limiting
• Autoflight Control Law Concepts
• Flutter Suppression
• Autonomous Landing / Obstacle Avoidance
• Autonomous Windshear Prediction
• Engine-Matching Modes
• State Estimation / Analytical Redundancy
• Pilot / Vehicle Interfaces
- Displays ( Primary, Caution / Warning )
- Controllers, Data Entry
- Procedures
2.8.6 List of Candidate Experimental Systems
• Fly By Wire / Light ( FBW / L ) Control System
• Crew Station Display System
• Autonomous Landing System
• Windshear Prediction System
• Flutter Suppression System
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To generate architectures, concepts, design methods, and
integrated design tools for information processing systems
required by future aircraft and spacecraft applications.
To develop concepts, approaches, and methods which increase the
performance and reliability and decrease the cost of applications
and systems software for ground and flight systems.
To provide analytical methods, assessment techniques,
experimental methodologies, and the AIRLAB facility for the
evaluation and validation of fault-tolerant, concurrent processing,
and distributed computer systems and software for spacecraft and
aircraft applications.
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FLIGHT CRITICAL DIGITAL SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY WORKSHOP
OBJECTIVES
Identify research issues which must be resolved
Define level of analysis experimentation and
demonstration required for acceptance of results
OUTPUT:
Workshop document (including consensus on most
important issues)
FOLLOWED BY:
Assessment of our program vs. identified needs
Feedback to industry on program
FLIGHT CRITICAL DIGITAL SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY WORKSHOP
PROCESS
Overview presentation to provide a context for the workshop
Working Group Sessions: Aero and Space Requirements
Design for Validation
i-mlure Modes
System Modeling
Reliable Software
Flight Test
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Some Thoughts On
Flight Critical Systems
Tom Cunningham
Honeywell Systems & Research Center
December 13, 1988
with help from:
Kevin Driscoll
Gautham Ramohalli
Russ Hendrick
Larry Yount
Randy Gaylor
John Weyrauch
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The Coverage Umbrella Must Be Big
L =, i i i i
Generic Failures_ d
Complexity Unknown HW
eats
, l
Complexity
i .u
• Functional Demands
- Reality of FBW, WLA, RSS, Envelope Limiting...
- More functions under the fault tolerant
umbrella, e.g., VMS
- Complex feedback mechanizations (are they
necessary?)
• Attempts at Safety
- "Cover every conceived failure"
- "If two channels are better than one, why not
ten ?"
° Hardware capability
- VLSI complexity
- New sensors and actuators
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• EME
• Lightning
"File digital electronic circuits used in modern FCSs arc
vulnerable to upset by decreasing levels of disturbance.
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The EMI:, threat is also increasing.
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THREAT INTRA/INTERSYSTEM
ELECTROMAGNETIC
INTERFERENCE
STATIC
DISCHARGES
LIGHTNING HIGH-ALTITUDE
ELECTROMAGNETIC
pULSE_(HEM_P_ ....
THREAT Local
EXPOSURE Usually
Antenna Related
local
Particle Related
local
Cloud Related
Regional
Nuclear Burst
EFFECTS Induced
Direct
Induced Direct
Induced
Induced
CRITICALITY Flight Safety Mission Flight Safety Flight Safety
THREAT Broadband
SPECTRUM Up to IOOGHz
PROTECTION
MEASURES
MIL-STDS
Broadband
Up to 100 MHz
Bro.,dband
Up to 100 MHz
Broadband
Upto 100 MHz
Shielding Discharges Diverlers EMI Techniques
Filtering EMI TechnK:lUeS. Surge arresters
Redundancy EMI Techniques
Cable/Equip. Placement
Fiber Optics
Channel Recovery Channel Recove_ Channel Recover), Channel Recovery__
MIL-E-6051 MIL-E-6051 MIL-E-6051 NONE
MIL-STD-461/462 MIL-B-5087 MIL-B-5087
MIL-B-5087 MIL-STD-1757
A new hazard is now facing commercial aviation.
Military aircraft have been lost due to this problem.
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Software Concerns
Too many design
Coding errors have
Ada features are of
Proof of software is
- Sabotage
- "Improvements"
- Security
errors are blamed on "Software"
not presented problems
concern
important:
Some "Software" Errors
System
ll|
JA-37 Viggen
STS-1 "Bug heard
round the world"
DIGITAC
Design/ No
Error Algorithm Code Compilel Error Other
WOW Switch not ',"
properly engaged
Syncronization of ",,/
computers
ABS/ 1/:: 1
Apache LHX
Demo
Compiler irqerp, of ,/
180 _ to -180"
!X-29 FSW Series of dangerou,'; _'_'
flight modes
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The Human Side of Design
Problems are solved by "people"
Solutions must be understood by people who
understand the problem
- Problems are complex --> Solutions nust be
simple
Find the one person on the team who can
explain the solution
• Avoid trust in "discipline" interfaces
- Hardware / Software
- Aircraft / Flight Control
• Preserve the "Corporate Memory"
Some Research Needs
ii I
1. Achievable Levels of Safety Assurance
2. Relative Importance of Byzantine Problem
3. Methodologies for Correct System Timing
4. Complexity Metrics
5. Psychological Factors in Design
6. Design Diversity
7. Tradeoffs between Avionics and Related Systems
8. Level of Verification Needed for Support Tools
9. Methodologies for Designing and Evaluating FBW Systems
10. Methodologies lor Developing and Verifying Correct Requirements
11. Ada Issues
12. Fiber Optics
13. An Objective List of Safe-Design Features (with relative values)
A-?:_
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NASA rest)urees are invaluable for lhis etTort.
• Simulation and analysis of architectures
• Fault insertion and instrumentation
• Characterization of upsets
• ATOPS aircraft flight testing
• EME environment characterization
• EME circuit effects characterization
fib C|_ 096%
Looking for a challenge ?
How about this ?
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NASA FLIGIIT CRITICAL SYSTEM WORKSifOPC[IAR1S
CARL S. DROST[
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GENERAL DYNAMICS FORT WORTH DIVISION
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WHAT IS THE EXPERIENCE BASE OF THE FORT WORTH DIVISION OF GENERAL
DYNAMICS (GD/FW) ON DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS?
O GD/FW HAS BEEN FORTUNATE TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP AND
FLY A NUMBER OF INTEGRATED DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS.
DO AFTI/F-16 DIGITAL FLCS
DO AFTI/F-16 AUTOMATIC MANEUVERING ATTACK SYSTEM
DO F-16 GUAD DIGITAL DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM
DO F-16 PRODUCTION DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
DO F-16 AUTOMATIC TERRAIN FOLLOWING SYSTEM
O GD/FW IS HEAVILY INVOLVED IN THE INTEGRATION OF A NUMBER OF
FLIGHT CRITICAL SYSTEMS NOW BEING DEVELOPED FOR FLIGHT TEST, BUT
NOT YET FLOWN (IN SOME CASES TEAMED WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS).
DO ATF
DO ATA
DO F-111 FLIGHT CONTROL MODERNIZATION
OO OTHER
O GD/FW IS IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF FLIGHT CRITICAL SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT FOR A NUMBER OF PROPOSED AIR VEHICLES.
DO ADVANCED VERSIONS OF THE F-16
DO NASP
DO E-7 STOVL
DO OTHERS
WHERE ARE THE SOFT SPOTS F0R FUTURE
FLIGHT CRITICAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT?
O MANY OF THE TRADITIONAL BOUNDARIES BETWEEN TECHNOLOGIES ARE
DISAPPEARING AND FLIGHT CRITICAL SYSTEM COMPLEXITY IS RAPIDLY
INCREASING.
O THE CRITICAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT TASK IS NOT A LINEAR FUNCTION OF
SYSTEM SIZE.
O CRITICAL SYSTEMS INTEGRATION TECHNOLOGY IS DIFFICULT TO TRANSFER.
) INCREASING DIVERGENCE BETWEEN DEMONSTRATED AND THEORETICAl
TECHNOLOGY -- REAL WORLD VERSUS PROMISES.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGYBOUNDARIESARE DISAPPEARING
AND SYSTEM COMPLEXITY IS RAPIDLY INCREASING
O THE NUMBER AND EXTENT OF SYSTEMS THAT FALL INTO THE CATEGORY
WHERE FAILURE CAN CAUSE IMMEDIATE RISK TO THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE
GREATLY INCREASED.
O THERE WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED INTEGRATION OF FLIGHT
CONTROL WITH _THER SYSTEMS.
OO PROPULSION
O0 AIR DATA
O0 AVIONICS
OO STRUCTURES
OO STORES MANAGEMENT
OO SECONDARY CONTROL
O MANY AIRCRAFT SUBSYSTEMS THAT ARE NOT FAULT TOLERANT ON THE
PRESENT GENERATION OF AIRCRAFT WILL HAVE TO BE MADE REDUNDANT OR
BE PROTECTED BY ANALYTIC REDUNDANCY.
O CONTROL LAW DESIGN WILL INCLUDE MANY MORE THAN THE TRADITIONAL
VARIABLES OF THE PAST.
LIFE CYCLE COST OF THE TOTAL INTEGRATED SYSTEM IS BECOMING AN
INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT FACTOR (I.E, RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY,
AVAILABILITY, ETC.).
THE CRITICAL SYSTEMS INTEGRATION ENGINEERING TASK IS NOT A LINEAR
FUNCTION OF THE SYSTEM SIZE
0 SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IS BRINGING TOGETHER MANY TRADITIONAL
TECHNICAL DISCIPLINES IN AN INTERACTIVE MANNER.
O WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, THE INTEGRATED SYSTEMS OF THE FUTURE
ARE FORCING US MORE AND MORE TO "DESIGN BY COMMITTEE".
O MOST OF US REALIZE HOW MUCH LONGER IT TAKES A COMMITTEE TO DO
SOMETHING.
0 THE CHALLENGE IS TO MAKE THIS COMMITTEE FUNCTION AS A CLOSE KNIT
TEAM TO MINIMIZE OVERHEAD.
O THE FOCUS OF THE TEAM MUST BE ON INTERACTIVE COMMUNICATION.
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THE CRITICAL SYSTEMS INTEGRATION ENGINEERING TASK IS NOT A LINEAR
FUNCTION OF THE SYSTEM SIZE (CONTINUED)
O EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS ESCALATE
DISPROPORTIONATELY WITH SYSTEM COMPLEXITY.
LOOKING AHEAD, WE MAY BE "DESIGNING BY BUREAUCRACY" IF WE ARE NOT
CAREFUL, PARTICULARLY I: WE FORGET THAT COMMUNICATION ACROSS
TECHNICAL BOUNDARIES IS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN STRUCTURE. THE
OVERHEAD MAY BECOME PROHIBITIVE UNLESS WE CAN FIND NEW WAYS OF
FUNCTIONING.
O UNDETERMINISTIC SYSTEM CONCEPTS SUCH AS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
WILL REQUIRE NEW VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION METHODS.
O PHILOSOPHICAL CHANGES IN HOW WE APPROACH SYSTEM DESIGN,
VERIFICATION, AND VALIDATION MAY BE REQUIRED BECAUSE
EXTRAPOLATION OF PRESENT METHODS BECOMES PROHIBITIVE.
CRITICAL SYSTEMS INTEGRATION TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN
DIFFICULT TO TRANSFER
MANY COST VERSUS SAFETY TRADES REQUIRE LARGE, EXPENSIVE PROGRAMS
TO FORCE COST EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION. ON RELATIVELY SMALL PROGRAMS,
FLIGHT CRITICAL SYSTEM INTEGRATION DECISIONS CAN BE GREATLY
INFLUENCED BY OTHER FACTORS, SINCE PRODUCTION MANUFACTURING AND
LONG TERM OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ARE NOT A PRIMARY CONSIDERATION.
O THERE IS RARELY ANY PROVABLE "BEST" WAY TO INTEGRATE SYSTEMS.
DIFFERENT TECHNICAL BACKGROUNDS AND EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT MANY
TIMES RESULT IN A NUMBER OF ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. SELECTION OF
THE "BEST" APPROACH IS OFTEN DEPENDENT ON THE GROUND RULES
SELECTED TO DO THE EVALUATION.
O EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS INTEGRATIONS RELIES ON PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONAL
ORGANIZATION AS IT DOES TECHNOLOGY.
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THE REAL WORLDVERSUS PROMISES
O POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS ARE COMING AT US AT AN EVER
INCREASING RATE.
O TECHNICAL POSSIBILITY IS OVER-SHADOWING TECHNOLOGY MATURATION IN
THE REAL WORLD.
IT DOES NOT TAKE A BIG ERROR IN GROUND RULE ASSUMPTIONS TO HAVE A
PARTICULAR TECHNOLOGICAL OR SYSTEM ENGINEERING APPROACH COLLAPSE
DOWN AROUND YOU.
O JUST BECAUSE SOMETHING HAS BEEN TALKED ABOUT FOR A HUMBER OF
YEARS DOES NOT MEAN IT IS TRUE AND IS SURELY NOT SOMETHING ON
WHICH YOU BUILD THE "NEXT" GENERATION.
O WE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL THAT OUR ZEAL AND INTEREST IN
TECHNOLOGICAL "ADVANCEHENT" DOES NOT GET US IN SERIOUS TROUBLE.
SYSTEM WIDE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT (SWIM) WILL BECOME A FUNDAMENTAL
SYSTEM ENGINEERING CONCEPT
0 THE REOUIREMENT IS NOW BECOMING APPARENT BY THE NEED TO INCLUDE
NON-REDUNDANT SYSTEMS AS PART OF FLIGHT CRITICAL SYSTEMS.
O0 AUTOMATIC MANEUVERING ATTACK SYSTEMS (AMAS)
DO AUTOMATIC TERRAIN FOLLOWING AND AVOIDANCE
OO AUTOMATIC GROUND COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS FOR
DISORIENTATION, INATTENTION, AND LOSS-OF-CONSCIOUSNESS.
O FAILURE PROTECTION MUST BE TREATED ON A SYSTEM WIDE BASIS AS
EARLY IN THE PROGRAM AS POSSIBLE.
O DESIGN AND SUPPORT TECHNICAL DISCIPLINES MUST BE INTEGRATED INTO
AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM ENGINEERING TEAM WITH EARLY EMPHASIS AND
PARIICIPATION OF SAFETY, RELIABILITY, HUMAN FACTORS, PVI. AND
OPERATIONS RESEARCH PERSONNEL.
O ALL SYSTEM COMPONENTS ASSUME A ROLE IN SWIM.
0 PROTECTION AFFORDED BY SYSTEM MUST BE ANALYZED AND DOCUMENTED.
A-aO
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NASA PURSUIT OF INTEGRATED SYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES
FEELING THE PRESSURE OF INCREASED SYSTEM INTEGRATION, MANY
RESEARCHERS ARE PURSUZNG THE TECHNOLOGY AT THE INTERFACE POINTS
BETWEEN THE TRADITIONAL TECHNICAL DISCIPLINES.
NASA is AT A STAGE WHERE DECISIONS NEED TO BE MADE RELATIVE TO HOW
DEEPLY NASA 0AST WANTS TO GET INTO THE SYSTEMS AREA. THERE ARE
TWO WAYS TO GO.
OO CONTINUE IN THE PRESENT MANNER WITH THE VARIOUS TECHNOLOGIES
EACH DEVELOPING ADVANCEMENTS IN THEIR IMMEDIATE INTERFACES AND
CONDUCTING LIMITED SYSTEM INTEGRATION TASKS NECESSARY FOR
EXPERIMENTS FOCUSING ON AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY.
00 DIVE COMPLETELY INTO THE FLIGHT CRITICAL SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
AREA.
EITHER ROUTE IS A PERFECTLY RATIONAL APPROACH, AND NASA WILL BE
PROVIDING VALUABLE TECHNOLOGY FOR THE FUTURE AIRCRAFT IN EITHER
CASE.
O THE HISTORICAL DIFFICULTY IN TRANSFERRING INTEGRATION TECHNOLOGY
SHOULD BE HEAVILY WEIGHED IN ANY NASA DECISIONS.
0 EFFECTIVE PURSUIT AND TRANSFER OF FLIGHT CRITICAL SYSTEMS
INTEGRATION TECHNOLOGY WILL REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT LONG-TERM FUNDING
COMMITMENTS AND REORGANIZATION.
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The FAA Systems Perspective
Federal
Jim Treacy
Aviation Administration
December 13, 1988
(There were no visual
aids used for this presentation)
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COIVIIVII_CIAL AVIATION FLIGHT-CRITICAL
RESEARCH NEEDS
13 DEC 88
LJ. Yount/RY. Hess
HoneyweU/SCFSG
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RECOVERABLE F4.ULTS
A Characteristic associated with digital computers
that knows several aliases (upset, soft fault, faults
with nonstationary observability)
Soft Faults can be induced by
- Environment;tl Factors (e.g.IKM:E,Nuclear p_u'ticlcs,ete)
- Hardware Factors
- Software Factors
In addition to being an obvious concern relative to
s,'tfety, soft faults may be a major contributor to
the concern associated with the costly MTBUR
unconfirmed removals problem
TRANSPARENT RECOVERY
EU DISRUPTION
DATA BUSING
I
i
EM PROTECTION I
ENHANCEO AREAl
J CP
TRANSFER OF
STATE VAR|ABLES
I_ I • i_ I
IEM PROTECTION I • ;EM pROTECTION i
i EHHANCEO AREA t • iENHANCED MEAl
L........ I .......
DATA BUSING
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SUMMARY
0 FAA CERTIFICATION BASIS FOR
_ONIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
- NEEDS FURTHER DEFINITION
o _ _OLOGY
- NEEDS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
o AIRCR_I_VIEPROT]_'I_/ON_L_rl]_VI]_
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Ki!Y TECHNOLOGIESFORTHE1990'S
RICHARDULLMAN
FLIGHTCRITICALWORKSHOP
LANGLEYRESEARCHCENTER
DECEMBER13-15,1988
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KEY TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE 1990'S
AN INDUSTRY STUDY OF HIGH-LEVERAGE
ENABLING AEROSW'ACE TECHNOLOGIES
AND ROADMAPS TO ATTAIN THEM
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SOME HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
III
1970 THE SMOKE STACKS
,Q
1975 - APPLIANCES
1980 - AUTOMOTIVE 11'4DUSTRY
1985 CONSUMER ELECTRONICS
? ' AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY
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CATALYSTS - AN .INDUSTRYCONSENSUS
AND A NATIONAL COMMITMENT
ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
COMPOSITE
MATERIALS VERY-LARGE
SCALE INTEGRATED
CIRCUITS
I
t
ADVANCED
SENSORS
THE
OF THE
FUTURE
SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT.
OPTICAL
INFORMATION
PROCESSING
PROPULSION
SYSTEMS
ULTRARELIABLE
ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS
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PROGRAM STATUS
• TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPS ARE BEING COORDINATED
• GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IS QUITE ACTIVE
• TECHNOLOGY TEAM MEMBERSHIP CONTINUES TO GROW
• KEY TECHNOLOGIES ASSESSED AS 40% OF TOTAL INDUSTRY TECH
DEVELOPMENT
$1.5B IR&D
$1.SB CR&D
• AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY POLICY FORUM WAS CONVENED
ll-|_lO -I_)
DEFENSE
URESROAI}I_P
ULTRARELIABLEELECTRONICSYSTF._ IN THE 21_t CENTURY
I ENtlAEE THE RELIABILITY OF ELECTRONICSYSTE/_, BY AT LEASTA MAGNITUDEWITtt]g
THE DECADE
I ACHIEVETHIS grilLE RF.JEING
ACOUIS1TIONCOSTS
DEVELOffEETTIE
CYCLETIlE THROUGHTHE PLANT
COSTOF OMERSHIP
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U_S ROADfIAP
Ai>P_RO_O_AC_!I.
i CULTURALCHAHE INIIOWTIlE,DESIGNPROCESSISAPPROACHF.OAWl)IIAIIA@ED-
"CONCURRENTENGINEERING"
i DEFECTFREEI_ACTURIHG
I TECHNOLOGYIII,Sf.iTlOi,I
I UN_RLYIH_rr,.B.1_._tlAN{:F11_%t,$.,..F-,l;t;,itllilllAl,_Y_II
RELA110tlStIIP10 lill INITIATIVE
i CONCURRENIENGINEERINGISIIIENGINEERINGARMOFI_I
i
i DEFECTFREEMANUFACTURINGISTHEULTIMATEGOALOF CONTINUOUSIMPROV&I_NT
A-,1 .()
TIESYSTENATICA_tt |0 TIE INTEGRATED,CO_CU_RENT_SIGNOFPRODUCTSAND
THEIRRELATEDPitOC(_._,INCLUDItIGHANUFACTUR[_DSUPPORT.illsAPPROACH
1SINTENDED10CkJJ_TIlEDEVELOPERSFR_ TIEOUTSET,OCONSIDERALLELFJ'IENTS
OFTilePROI_TLIFECYCLEFROMCO_EPTI_THROUGHDISPOSf&,]NCLUDiNGOUALITY,
COST,SCiEBI..EAN_U_ERP_OUIP_r..W._T$.
CONCURRENT ENGINEERING
I
REQUIREMENT
]::>.
SEQUENTIAL ENGINEERING
PROOUCTDEVELOPMENT PROCESSDEVELOPMENT
]::> I>
PROTOTYPE
7:>
CONCURRENT ENGINEERING
REQUIREMENT
Z:>
_ PRODL_'rDEVELOPMENT
PROCESSDEVELOPMENT
I_ PROTOTYPE
'-
AN INTEGRATED PROCESS WHICH ENGINEERS THE PRODUCT
AND THE MANUFACTURING AND SUPPORT PROCESSES TOGETHER
WITH EMPHASIS ON EFFICIENCY, INCREASED QUALITY AND REDUCED COST.
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CONCURRENT ENGINEERING
I
SELECTEDCASE STU DIES
_ ii
CASE STUDY
McDONt_f LL DOUGI-AS
iiQL_ IALLISTIC
_._li'l _tk,_ 0IVI.SION
¢,Ikl
HI[Wq.I[TT,Pa_KARDCO,
tNSTIRtJ44t.NT DIVISION
IBM
QUALITYCOST "' SCHEDULE
tOq_ E,AVtI, AGI ON DID FOR
REACTOR AND MISSILE
PRO,,RG"lr IL
REDUCED LABOR RATES
BY S,?JUHOUR; COST
_AVINGS 301k BELOW BID.
COST OF REPAIR FOR NEW
CIRCUIT PACK
PRODUCTION CUT AT
LEAST
:b0% ACTUAL 8AVlNGS IN
DEVELOPMENT COST FOR
CONSTRUCTION
EQUIPMENT.
MANUFACTURING COET8
REDUCED 42_&.
PRODUCT DIRECT
ASSEMBLY LABOR HOURS
REDUCED 45%.
SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS (REDUCTION
FROM 4S WEEKS TO I HOURS) iN
ONE PIIASE OF tIIGtt SPEED
VEiIICL_ PRELIMINARY DESIGN; 11
MON|H SAVING ON TAV.,IB DESIGN.
PART AND MATERIALS LE.AD..TIME
REDUCED BY 30%: ONE PART OF
DESIGN ANALYSIS REDU_.,ED BY
OVER I0%,.
TOTAL PROCESS TIME REDUCED TO
44Rk OF BASELINE FOR SESS, _
SAVINGS IN DL=VF.L_
TIME.
REDUCED DEVELOPMENT CVCUE-
TIME 3S%.
SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN
I I:NGTH OF PMT DESIGN CYCLE.
40% REDUCTION IN ELECTRONIC
DESIGN C¥CLF-
SCRAP REDUC#,D idP&, NEWORK COST
REK)UCED _ AND IleL)N,
CONEORM,iJ, ICZl NII.KR_I,D II_; WELD
DE! I:CT5 PLR UNiT DEC,RI;J551;D Tb'_;
i_P/, FEWER CH&NGES ON R[ACTOH;
U% FEWER DR&WING CNANGE& ON
TAV-BB.
FLOOR INE.PECTK)N RATIO
DECREASED BY OVER _ MATERIAL
II, HORTAGES REDUCED FROM 12=/= TO
O, _ DEfECT-FREE OPERATION.
DEFECT_ REDUCED BY 30'% TO S'r%.
NUMBER OF INSPECTORI Ri_DUC[D lily
2/3.
PRODUCT FIELD FAILURE RATE
REDUCED f_0"& ¢CRAP AND REWORK
REDUCED 75%.
FEWER ENGINEERING CHANGES.
GUARANTEED PROI}UCIBIUrIf AND
TESTABILITY.
CONCURRENT ENGINEERING
SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS
O
O
O
TOTAL SYSTEM ENGINEERING -.FRAMEWORK FOR SYSTEM
INTEGRATION AND OPTIMIZATION .
MULTIDISCIPLINE TEAMS - INTEGRATED PRODUCT AND PROCESS
ENGINEERING, STREAMLINED PROCESSES
QUALITY ENGINEERING METHODS - EFFICIENT PRODUCT AHD
PROCESS OPTIMIZATION
CAD/CAF_JCAM - MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE, RAPID TRAN3F:,-, _.--
BENEFITS, REDUCTION OF ERRORS, EFFICIENT DATA COLLEC[ ,ON
AND ANALYSIS, EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION
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DESIGN
CHANGES
SEQUENTIAL
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l DEFECT FREE MANUFACTURING "" ."
- TRANSITION TEAMS
- CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
- PROCESS OPTIMIZATION
- SPC
- TQM
- RELIABILITY MODEL TO REFLECT MANUFACTURING PROCESS
TECHNOLOGY INSERTION
- VLSI
- MIMIC
- VHSIC
- SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES
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NEEDED:
ULTRA RELIABLE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS
(URES) (Continued)
HUMAN CAPITAL :
• INDUSTRIAL EXHIBITION
- CRYSTAL PALA(_E, LONDON
- 1851
• DOMINANT WORLD POWERS
- #1 - BRITAIN
- #2 - U.S.
• BRITISH BUSINESSMEN AMAZED AT U.S. PRODUCTS
• LITERACY RATE
- U.S. - 90%
- BRITAIN- 67%
ULTRA RELIABLE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS
(URES) (Continued)
HUMAN CAPITAL
• 1980's
.i
• DOMINANT WORLD POWER
- #1 U.S.
- #2 JAPAN
• AMERICAN CEO's MARVEL AT THE QUALITY OF
JAPANESE PRODUCTS FLOODING THE MARKET
• LITERACY RATE
- JAPAN - 95%
- u.s. 8o%
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THE LOOMING MISMATCH
BETWEEN WORKERS AND JOBS
II I
• ACTUAL SKILL LEVELS OF NEW WOmKtRS
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NEW PRODUCT 1D VELOPMENT
TIME NEEDED TO
DEVELOP A NEW CAR
TOYOTA - _ YEARS
DETROIT-S YEARS
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
NOVEMBBR,_qE.,_R 1eBB
)ll[ FRODUCTION . ._
CYCLE TIME THROUGH
THE PLANT
TOYOTA - 2 DAYS
DETROIT - _ DAYS
I CUSTOMER _
INVENTORY TURNS FOR' TIME NIEDED TO SCHE.
THE ENTIRE SUPPLY CHJUN DULl A DEALER'S ORDER
TOYOTA • |i TIMES/YEAR TOYOTA • I DAY
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URES ROADMAP (Continued)
I
BASIC FACTS .
1. TOYOTA CAN DEVELOP A NEW CAR IN 3 YEARS V5 IDi_iTI_(_II_I._
YEARS
2. INVENTORY TURNS FOR ENTIRE SUPPLY CHAIN
TOYOTA 16 TIMES/YEAR
DETROIT 8 TIMES/YEAR
3. TIME NEEDED TO SCHEDULE A DEALERS O_DER
TOYOTA - 1 DAY
DETROIT - 5 DAYS
4. PRODUCTION CYCLE TIME THROUGH THE PLANT
TOYOTA 2 DAYS
DETROIT 5 DAYS
5. F-15 AJC BUILT IN JAPAN DEMONSTRATE HIGHER RELIABILITY,
REDUCED MAINTENANCE
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APPENDIX B
Summary Viewgraphs
B-1
NASA-LaRC FLIGHT-CRITICAL
I)IGITAL SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
WORKSHOP
December 13-15, 1988
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